






T. W. Gordon.



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DUTY

OF

OFFICERS

COMMANDING

DETACHMENTS IN THE FIELD

BY COL. G. A. GORDON

NEW YORK: PUBLISHED BY G. A. GORDON, 1864.

D U T Y
OF
O F F I C E R S
COMMANDING
DETACHMENTS IN THE FIELD.

By JOHN ORMSBY VANDELEUR,
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF THE 8TH, OR KING'S ROYAL
IRISH LIGHT DRAGOONS.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. EGERTON, AT THE MILITARY LIBRARY,
NEAR WHITEHALL.

1801.

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BY JOHN ORMSBY VANDERKAM,

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1861.

ALL the military books which I have read except those on drill or formation, appear to me to be more calculated for the instruction of generals, than officers in less elevated situations, not possessing that minute detail, which seems necessary for those who are to perform the subordinate detached duties; but particularly those who have not had an opportunity of serving before an enemy in the field. For my brother officers of this description, this little treatise is intended; to them, I flatter myself, it may be of some use, during their first campaign, while it is humbly submitted to the perusal of those of more experience, from whom I expect that the indulgence due to my intentions will prevent a too just criticism.

I have chiefly compiled it from approved German and French writers, not adhering to their words, but endeavouring to apply the principles (by them laid down) to small detachments; what little I have ventured
to

to add from my own observations will, I hope, be found consonant to those principles, and to the present practice. If I have touched upon duties above the sphere of those for whom I profess to write; it must be recollected, that to occupy our extensive colonies, the army is divided into several corps, each of which requires the same operations and details as a great army, and that consequently the service which in Europe is conducted by a general officer, will in America, or the Cape of Good Hope, devolve on one of much less elevated rank; and though the troops under his command will be fewer, yet the principles are the same.

Books referred to in the Marginal Notes.

MILITARY Institutions attributed to the King of Prussia.
Tome—Ebn for l'Art de la Guerre.
Principes de la Guerre.
L'ordonnance—Wittgenstein's Treatise on Winter Campaigns.
An excellent Treatise written in German, comprising the
theoretical, Tactical, Campaign, Tactics, and the Art of
War, written by Mr. Moltke, Captain of the Corps of No-
ble Cadets at Hesse Cassel, for the Use of the Young Gentle-
men of that Corps.
And the whole—Translated by the Honourable Lieutenant
Colonel Lloyd.

I have quoted part of Military Institutions verbatim, to show that
the list of the Treatises agrees with the main principle.
Only having Remarks which I took from Tome by me, I cannot
pay him.

Books referred to in the Marginal Notes.

* MILITARY Instructions attributed to the *King of Prussia*.

Turpin—Essai sur l'Art de la Guerre.

Bosroger—Principes de la Guerre.

Lindenau—Winter Posterungen, or a Treatise on Winter Campaigns.

An excellent Treatise written in German, comprising Mathematics, Fortification, Gunnery, Tactics, and the Art of War, written by Mr. *Mauvillion*, Captain of the Corps of Noble Cadets at Hesse Cassel, for the Use of the Young Gentlemen of that Corps.

And *Templehoffe*—Translated by the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel *Lindsay*.

* I have quoted part of Military Instructions verbatim, to shew that the rest of the Treatise agrees with them in principle.

Only having Extracts which I took from *Turpin* by me, I cannot page him.

DUTY OF OFFICERS

COMMANDING

DETACHMENTS IN THE FIELD.

Of Picquets in General.

AN army in the presence of an enemy must always have troops detached in front and on its flanks, to secure it from surprise and the fatigue which would otherwise be occasioned by constant alarms. Those detachments are generally composed of light troops, cavalry or infantry, or both, according to the nature of the country; and the posts they occupy are called out-posts.

For the same reason that the army detaches troops to occupy the out-posts, so must each out-post detach parties for its own immediate security. Those parties are called piquets,* and are sometimes commanded by a field officer, but generally by a captain, a subaltern, or a serjeant; a piquet is the epitome of an out-post, as the latter is of an

* I have adopted the term *piquet* as that most used in our service.

army, and detaches vedettes or sentries for its own security.

A piquet is the first command of importance that will be entrusted to a young officer; upon his diligence and prudence on this duty, depends not only the fate of the post which the piquet covers, but eventually that of the whole army; he therefore cannot be too circumspect.

When an army marches into a new position, the arrangement of a piquet is often left to the officer who commands it, he who posts him not having sufficient time to reconnoitre the ground minutely. When a young officer is so circumstanced, the few rules herein contained may be of use to him.

Of Cavalry Piquets on a Plain.

A CAVALRY officer mounting a piquet on a plain must visit all the vedettes in person, make them repeat the countersign and orders, which they have received, and set them right if they have misunderstood them; he must examine the ground minutely, and observe that every vedette can see those posted on his right and left and the intermediate space, and that the flank vedettes see those of the next piquets; so that nothing can pass between them without their knowledge: if there is any space not commanded by some of the vedettes, he must supply the defect by posting one there, and report it when relieved. He must then send
out

out small patrols to the nearest commanding situations towards the enemy; and every precaution being thus taken for his security, he will order half the horses to be fed, and when they have done, the other half; but on no account must more than half be unbridled at the same time: the dragoons may at the same time sit down at their horses heads, and in their ranks, and refresh themselves with the provisions which they have brought with them in their canteens and haversacks; but making fires must be avoided as much as possible, as the smoke would serve as an index to the enemy; except in a village or farm house, where it is confounded with that of the inhabitants; but at night it should never be allowed, except the severity of the weather renders it indispensibly necessary, and then in the lowest and most concealed situations.

It would be well to move the piquet at night a little to the right or left, so that a patrol of the enemy, having learned from some spy or deserter, where it was posted in the day, and coming at night, expecting to surprise it, may be taken in flank: in such a case no firing must be allowed, but the piquet must observe the most profound silence to the moment that they charge; nor indeed should a dragoon ever make use of his fire arms, except when ordered to skirmish, or as a vedette to give the alarm.

The vedettes must be frequently visited and kept alert; they should be double, in order that one may come in and report, should any thing suspici-

ous appear, which the commanding officer must himself verify, and send his report to the officer commanding the post from whence he is detached, if it should be an enemy; but he must not make any report without first having ascertained the fact in person.

The vedettes must keep up a constant communication at night by (one) riding gently to the right and left until he meets those on his flanks, the other standing still, his carbine recovered.

If it can be afforded without harraffing the men too much, there should be two lines of vedettes, of which the first line might be single. By day the first line should be advanced two or three hundred paces in front of the second, but drawn back at night so as to be seen by the latter; and all should be drawn nearer to the piquet.

At sun-setting and dawn the officer commanding a piquet should make a patrol as far forward as he can, without risking to be cut off by the enemy getting between him and his piquet.

All the horses must be bridled at sun-setting and remain so till clear day; the dragoons must lay at their horses heads in their ranks, holding the bridoon rein all night.

In very cold or blowing weather, when men are most inclined to sleep, the vedettes should be relieved every hour, the two men posted together at different times; by which method they are visited by the relief every half hour: this should be practised also very near the enemy, when half or one third of the piquet should always be mounted.

If

If the piquet is a strong one, commanded by a field officer or captain, he detaches a small one in front, which furnishes the vedettes, as the main body does the patroles. The patroles consist of a non-commissioned officer, and two, three or four men, but an officer must frequently accompany them; their business is to keep the vedettes alert during the night, to advance beyond them, and endeavour by listening to discover if any thing approaches; for which purpose a man should dismount and lay his ear close to the ground, by which means he will hear much further.

A communication must be kept up with the piquets on the flanks by patroles also. The commanding officer should in the day point out to the officers and non-commissioned officers the roads which they are to patrol at night. Should the patrol fall in with an enemy of superior force, they must endeavour to conceal themselves from him behind some wall, hedge, or any thing that offers, let him pass quietly, and immediately return and report.

Should the vedettes or patroles report the approach of an enemy, the commanding officer orders his piquet to mount, while he advances with a few men to reconnoitre. If he perceives him to be only a patrol and not in too superior force, he immediately charges him with half or two thirds of his piquet, leaving the rest in reserve, to second the attack or cover the retreat, as occasion may require. But intelligence must be first sent to the post from which the piquet was detached—Should

the darkness of the night prevent a possibility of ascertaining the enemy's force by the eye, then he must be charged without hesitation: if he is only a patrol, he will probably be defeated, though double or treble the number of the piquet; as the party who attack boldly have always (but particularly at night) a considerable advantage over those who are attacked. If on the other hand, it should turn out to be a strong column of the enemy, the charge will give the head of his advanced guard such a check, that the piquet will have full time to retreat in good order, giving notice to the officer commanding the post from which it is detached, and to the piquets on its flanks; which notice will be communicated by them along the chain.

When the commanding officer of a piquet has defeated a party of the enemy, he must not pursue them with the whole of his party, but detach a few to make prisoners, who are not to venture farther than four or five hundred yards, and should they fall in with his reserve, they must immediately return to the main body.

The commanding officer must then re-post his vedettes who were driven in, and ascertain by patrols that all is safe before he suffers his piquet to dismount.

A piquet occupying new ground must not dismount before the commanding officer has reconnoitred it minutely, and posted the vedettes; at the relief, the commanding officer of the old piquet must ride round the vedettes and detached piquets, if

if there are any, with his successor, and give him every information in his power.

The officer commanding a piquet makes all his arrangements before he dismounts his men; such as telling off his divisions, appointing officers and non-commissioned officers to command them, skirmishers, &c.

If the piquet is strong enough, it should be told off in three divisions; the first attacks, the second supports it, and the third is left in reserve; but there must always be a reserve, be it ever so small; at the same time that the first division attacks the front, the second falls upon the flank and rear. Even a few pistol shots fired, in the rear of the enemy, will alarm him for his retreat.

Should the enemy appear in superior force in the day light, the commanding officer (having made his report) should make the greatest display of his force, while he is yet distant, in the manner laid down by H. R. H. the DUKE of YORK, in his instructions to the cavalry on the Continent of Europe in the year 1793, which are to be found at the end of General D. Dundas's book of Cavalry Manœuvre, until he receives further orders.

As there might be some broken ground, or other impediment, which would render an expeditious communication in the ordinary way difficult between some of the piquets, the officers going on that duty would do well to agree upon some signal to convey the intelligence, in case any of them should be obliged to retreat: for instance, lighting a fire, or a particular sound of the bugle; this is

only necessary when the piquets are advanced a considerable distance in front of the post.

All patrols and reliefs must constantly examine their girths, arms, and ammunition, before they go out, and a general examination must take place at day break, as the horses will have emptied themselves during the night.

A piquet of cavalry posted on the banks of a river should be covered from the view of the enemy at the other side, and protected from his fire by a hill, mound of earth, clump of trees, &c. but houses must be avoided, as they encrease the danger of a cannonade instead of being a protection; if the river is fordable or has a bridge, a vedette should be placed on the other side, the vedettes posted along the bank must command the whole course of that part of the river entrusted to the piquet.

Should an enemy attempt to pass, the piquet should prevent him from forming and establishing himself, by constantly charging him, until orders arrive in consequence of the report that has been sent off on his first appearance.

In action a party of cavalry is posted five or six hundred paces in the rear of artillery for its protection, the officer commanding such party must keep his eye upon the gun or guns under his protection, and advance as they advance; should the enemy's cavalry approach them, he must likewise draw nearer, so as to be able to charge him, should he make any attempt on the guns; should he advance skirmishers, skirmishers should be advanced against them; but the main body kept ready
to

to charge. If the guns retreat, every thing must be risked for their preservation, and the enemy must at all hazard be resisted until they are unlimbered and ready to fire, (or in a place of safety) when the party will again take post in the rear.

Of Cavalry Piquets in an inclosed Country.

HAVING detailed the duties of the commanding officer of a cavalry piquet on a plain, the next thing to be considered is that of one posted in an inclosed country.

In such a country the piquet generally consists of both cavalry and infantry; however, cases often occur when it will be necessary to post piquets, consisting of the former only in such a country.

For instance, a plain intervening between the piquet and the post from which it is detached, would render the retreat of infantry extremely difficult in the event of a serious attack; therefore it is sometimes absolutely necessary to post a piquet consisting of cavalry only in such a country.

Suppose the spot chosen for the picket, that where two or more roads meet leading to the territory occupied by the enemy; the commanding officer, on his arrival on the ground, orders a non-commissioned officer and two or three privates to advance three or four hundred paces on each road and take post; he then takes a few men with him (leaving the rest mounted) carefully reconnoitres those

those roads, and posts his vedettes, taking care to choose the spots which command the most extensive views towards the enemy. If an officer relieves another, he is not at liberty to remove vedettes from the ground on which he finds them, but he may add as many as he thinks necessary for the security of his piquet, without harassing his party too much; reporting the addition which he has made when relieved.

The vedettes should be double: it would be desirable that they could be seen by the piquet; but as the windings and turning of the roads, with hedge-rows on the sides, may prevent that; a continuation of vedettes, each seeing the next to him, must occupy the intermediate space; those last may be single; as they cannot see one another at night, they must ride gently (except the advanced one, who stands still looking towards the enemy) backwards and forwards until they meet those in their front and rear. Vedettes alway carry the carabine recovered and ready to fire. Without those precautions, in an inclosed country, infantry, creeping behind the inclosures, might get behind the vedette and surprize the piquet.

The commanding officer, having posted his vedettes, sends out his patroles, dismounts his men, and orders half his horses to be fed as before.

Should an enemy approach, he advances with half or two thirds of his piquet to reconnoitre, leaving the rest in reserve; the leading division must advance with as great a front as possible, so as to occupy the whole breadth of the road, that it
may

may not be out-flanked; the others follow in file as much on the side of the road as they can, to leave room for the first to retire if necessary, while they form up to the front and cover the retreat alternately. That part of the piquet left in reserve, sends out patrols on the other roads in the mean time, but not more than five or six hundred paces,* and takes a position on the road side, to cover the retreat of the other divisions by charging the pursuing enemy in flank; taking care not to expose its own at the same time.

If the commanding officer, upon reconnoitring the enemy, does not find him too superior in number, or supported by infantry, he charges him boldly; but must not commit himself in the pursuit; allowing only one division to follow; and that with caution, lest there should be infantry in the rear, behind the inclosures. Having repulsed the enemy, he insures the safety of his piquet by patrols, and reposts his vedettes, before he suffers his men to dismount. But should he perceive the enemy to be in very superior force, or supported by infantry, he must immediately retreat in a gentle trot, lest the latter running along inside the inclosures should gain his flank. The cavalry must be kept at a respectful distance by skirmishers.

He of course gives notice to the post in his rear before he begins to retreat.

If there are any roads in his rear, leading to

* If those patrols advanced too far, they might be cut off if the piquet retreated.

piquets on his flanks, he will communicate with them by patroles; and lest they should retreat without giving him notice, and leave his flanks exposed, he will detach small piquets or vedettes on those roads at a proper distance, to prevent any surprise from that quarter; as he passes those roads, in retreating, he will withdraw those piquets or vedettes, who will join his rear guard.

It would be well to dig a ditch on each of the roads leading to the enemy, in front of the advanced vedette, it should be about four feet deep and six wide, the excavated earth, thrown inward, will make a breast-work four feet high, at one end of which there must be a space left sufficient for a horse to descend into the ditch, and a slope made for him to reascend at the other side, and at the opposite end of the ditch from that on which he descends. This construction renders it much less accessible to an enemy, than if the passage was straight across the ditch. This passage is left for the patroles, which must be more frequent as the view is not so extensive as on a plain; should the commanding officer have reason to suppose that a patrole is cut off, he must immediately report it.

If tools for digging are not to be had, strong bushes laid across the road, the branches projecting outwards, should be substituted for the ditch; they should be made fast with stakes, six and a half feet long, pointed at both ends, sunk diagonally two feet in the ground, and also projecting outwards; if stakes cannot be procured, the bushes must be made fast with stones, a passage must be left at one
end

end for the patrols, which the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding them must always see stopped when they re-enter.

A cavalry officer being ordered to take post at a village, should keep it in his front, posting vedettes beyond it, whose position and that of the whole piquet, he should change after dark, lest any of the inhabitants should have given information to the enemy. In all situations he must remember not to suffer any person to pass outwards without a regular passport: the reason of keeping it in front is, that the enemy's infantry might enter it by the gardens, and cut off the piquet if in front of the village. If there is a steeple or any other building, commanding an extensive prospect, he must post an intelligent man on the top, and mount there frequently in person; the man may be withdrawn at night, unless any of the enemy's posts are so near as to be seen from it, or in fine, unless his remaining there can be useful.

When an enemy approaches a post, and either from the closeness of the country, or darkness of the night, a thick fog, or any other cause, his force cannot be ascertained by the eye, he must be *felt*, in order to make a true report; and this is attended with little or no danger; as so circumstanced, a small party may (after penetrating into the midst of the advanced guard of a column) make its retreat in good order, in a country which is known to its officer, and even annoy and retard the enemy by its skirmishers.

An

An out piquet of cavalry must never be suffered to get into stables or barns; they could not turn out quick enough either to attack the enemy or to retreat.

Cavalry must always make, never wait for the assault, but they are not to quit their post for that purpose; one or two intelligent men must have orders not to engage in any *melée*, but be ready to carry any report which may be necessary; as what was at first supposed to be only a patrol, may turn out to be a strong column of the enemy.

Of Mixed Piquets.

AN officer commanding a piquet, composed of both arms, should observe all the precautions recommended in the foregoing instructions for cavalry. He will take notice if there are any bye paths by which infantry might approach, and post sentries on them, and vedettes on the high roads; if he is posted on a plain, the cavalry must be in front, and the infantry cover themselves by any hedge, ditch, wall, thicket, or ravine in the rear.

If a wood is in front, or on the flank, it must be carefully reconnoitred by patrols of infantry, who penetrate the thickest part of it; and double sentries be posted on all the paths leading through it towards the enemy; all which should be fortified by *abatis's*, at one side of which a passage must be left for the patrols, to be stopped when they re-enter.

If

If the piquet is strong, small detached piquets of a non-commissioned officer and three or four men should be posted on the paths; if the wood is a small one, vedettes from the cavalry are posted at the other side, on the plain, and the roads; and those small infantry parties in the issues of the wood. The cavalry vedettes are withdrawn at night. In those situations cavalry are for the most part attached to the piquet merely for the purpose of patrolling.

The commanding officer having posted his detached piquets, vedettes, &c. assigns their stations to the different troops.

If the post is on a road, a ditch is made as before mentioned, and guarded by a party of infantry, having a cavalry vedette advanced to give notice of the enemy's approach; the vedette retreating stoops on his horse's neck, as he descends into the ditch, that the infantry may fire over him, if pursued. The flanks must be secured by small piquets of infantry, in the fields, on each side behind the inclosures; but if the piquet is a small one, sentries only must be substituted. The cavalry are posted in the rear of the infantry, and send out frequent patrols. Behind the inclosures, at one side of the road and in front of the ditch above mentioned, some infantry should be sent to fire on the enemy in flank when he advances to dislodge the guard from its entrenchment. Upon the first notice of his approach, a small patrol of infantry, commanded by a non-commissioned officer, whose reports can be depended upon, must be sent

sent forward on his flank to reconnoitre. Should it be necessary to retreat, the small detached parties are called in and formed in the rear of the cavalry, with the body of the piquet; the party that guarded the entrenchment follow and do the same, a party of infantry is then thrown behind the inclosure on the side of the road, who cover the retreat of the dragoons in their turn; but whom they must be careful to let pass before they fire on those of the enemy; after which the dragoons will charge, and the two arms thus alternately cover each other's retreat, while the enemy continues to press with his cavalry; should he bring up artillery, or infantry in such force as to endanger the surrounding and cutting off of the piquet, then the two arms must separate, the cavalry gaining the post in its rear in a trot by the road, and the infantry through the fields, by the bye ways, which of course, have been previously reconnoitred. Should the piquet have more cavalry than is sufficient for a rear guard, that is to occupy the breadth of the road with its front, the rest may precede the infantry on its retreat.

If the piquet is posted in a village, the cavalry remain in the rear, ditches as before described will be made at all the issues towards the enemy, and guarded by infantry, the reserve of which will be kept in some central situation. Should want of time, or any other impediment, prevent the making of ditches or abatis's, waggons filled with dung may be substituted. Sentries must be posted on all the paths leading through the gardens to
the

the country, and vedettes in front of the infantry guards at the entrances.

Should the enemy approach in the night, the infantry must defend the avenues where they are posted; but must not pursue him when repulsed; but patroles should be sent out to ascertain whether his retreat be real or not. If he is only a patrole, he will retreat upon finding the piquet alert; but if it appears by the weight of his fire, or the vigour of his attack, that he is in force, the retreat must be made in the greatest silence and good order, the cavalry charging any of those of the enemy who may dare to approach. If the night is very dark, the cavalry will not cover the retreat, as the noise of their horses would inform the enemy where to direct his fire. In the day time, a few infantry posted in houses at the end of the village, next our own army, will effectually check the pursuit of cavalry by their fire from the windows, which will be seconded by the charge of the cavalry; this infantry may rejoin its party by the lanes or paths leading through the gardens to the rear; all of which should be reconnoitred on first taking possession of the post.

When a mixed party of both arms is to defend any redoubt, or other work, the infantry occupy the work, and the cavalry take post at some distance in the rear, covered from the view and fire of the enemy as much as possible; ready to charge him should he attempt to storm the work, and seize any artillery which he may advance against it.—To take a gun, a few men are detached, who gallop

up on its flanks in file, cut down the gunners, and force the drivers away with them; their retreat is covered by the rest of the party, who trot up in good order to support them.

If the work is to be abandoned, the cavalry cover the retreat.

When an officer, commanding an advanced piquet, hears any firing of guns, or sees any dust, or any thing else, which indicates an enemy being in motion, he immediately reports it to his superior. —It is very easy to distinguish, by the quantity of dust, whether the party that occasions it, is a strong one or not.

A piquet should always be as much concealed from the enemy as possible; but should be able to see him at a great distance by means of its vedettes: for instance, if a hill is the post, the party should not be on the summit, where it would be conspicuous, but a little behind it, and the vedettes advanced.

An officer commanding a piquet (where one can be procured) should always have a waggon ready to carry off any man who may be wounded.

Cavalry, posted on a plain, with infantry behind a ditch, hedge, or ravine, or in some thicket in its rear, should endeavour to draw any enemy, who advances to attack it, under the fire of the latter, and charge him immediately after he has received it.

Infantry

Infantry Piquets.

AN officer of infantry establishes his piquet behind a wall, hedge, ditch, or in a house, or village, and adds as much to the security of his post as his time will permit, by abatis's, &c. ; and, in fine, he will take all the precautions recommended to cavalry, and mixt piquets. As he has not cavalry with him, he must substitute sentries in the most commanding situations in the day time : those may be withdrawn at night ; and those only continued on the paths by which the enemy can approach, and not farther advanced than is necessary to give information. If he is posted in a house, he will construct a small fleche or redoubt outside the door, the fire of which will cross that from the lower windows, outside which (if they are low) ditches will be dug, (and the excavated earth thrown against the wall, not to afford cover to the enemy). — Those ditches are to prevent him from firing through the lower windows into the house, the end of the fleche or redoubt must not join the wall of the house, but a passage be left open at each side for the patroles. To cover those passages, traverses will be thrown up, joining the wall of the house, and projecting four or five feet from it. — But for the defence of houses, the reader is referred to *Principes de la Guerre*, by *Mons. de Bosroger*. On the Conduct of Infantry Piquets posted in in-

terfected Countries, Woods, and Villages, enough has been said under the head of *Mixed Piquets*.

An officer commanding a piquet on a river's bank, should conceal it from the enemy behind some hedge, clump of trees, or some other covert, and post his sentries so as to command a view of the river, to the next piquets on his right and left; he should cause them to be frequently visited and kept alert, and should keep up a communication with the piquets on his flanks by patrols.

When a party of infantry retreats, it should avoid open ground, and keep near hedges or other inclosures, by which it can be protected from cavalry. If a piquet of infantry is posted on a plain, (which cannot happen except where the army is destitute of cavalry,) the officer commanding it must construct a redoubt or abatis for his security; for which reason, every officer, particularly of infantry, should understand practical field fortification, which is extremely simple and easy to be learned. It is to be understood, that a piquet, whether of cavalry or infantry, is never to quit its post on any account whatsoever, except when compelled by superior force: but, having repulsed the enemy, it immediately resumes its previous position. This is not to prevent a few dragoons from being detached in pursuit to complete the defeat, and make prisoners; but, as before said, they must not venture too far.

The piquets of the advanced guard and outposts are generally relieved about an hour before dawn, that they may be doubled at that time
when

when the enemy most commonly makes his attack.

As by the negligence of some of the piquets, an enemy may have slipped between two of them, the commanding officer of a piquet should send patroles to his rear, as well as his front and flanks.— It is not meant by any thing that has been here said, that a piquet is to resist a very superior force; but that it is to know that force to be superior before it retreats, in order not to harass unnecessarily the corps from which it is detached, by suffering it to be disturbed by every little patrole.

O U T - P O S T S.

HAVING considered piquets in every situation, out-posts, which differ from them only in consisting of more men, and not being so frequently relieved, naturally follow.

The commanding officer of a detachment of light troops ordered to occupy an out-post, detaches small piquets of cavalry on all the roads in front and on his flanks, before he suffers the dragoons to dismount, or the infantry to quit their ranks; he then reconnoitres the ground minutely, assisted by some of the inhabitants (if there are any), and orders the detail of piquets according to the nature of the post. If it is night when he arrives with his detachment, or too late in the day to examine the ground minutely, the troops must lie on their arms all night; half the horses only must be unbridled at

a time to feed. As soon as he has reconnoitred the ground perfectly, and has posted his piquets on all the roads, by which the enemy might approach his post, he puts it in the best state of defence, by constructing abatis's and entrenchments wherever they appear to him necessary, and placing his artillery in the most advantageous situations for sweeping the principal avenues. If he has orders to maintain his post as long as possible, he must construct a good redoubt in the rear, there to make a last stand with the infantry and artillery, while the cavalry, at a convenient distance, take every opportunity of seconding their efforts by occasionally charging the enemy. A situation which is not commanded must be pitched upon for the redoubt; and every thing within six hundred paces of it, which might serve to cover an enemy, must be removed or destroyed. Wigwams must be built in a dry situation for the men; the horses of the cavalry must be saddled, and those of the artillery harnessed at sunset, and remain so all night; and the men must sleep in their clothes. If the post is in an open country, piquets of infantry are posted in the most convenient situations for them—such as in thickets, or behind walls or ditches, and cavalry in their front upon the plain: if in a village, the men must be kept as much together, and as near their alarm-posts, (which must be assigned them) as possible.—Infantry guards, posted at all the entrances, which must be traversed or abatified; the reserve kept ready in the church, or some large house in a central situation. If the village is a straggling one, with many
entrances

entrances or openings, which cannot be all guarded without dividing the detachment too much, they must be rendered difficult by abatis's, ditches, &c. in passing which the enemy will break and get into confusion; in which state he will be charged by parties sent against him from the main body, which remains in a central situation. The horses of the cavalry and artillery are piqueted, and the men in tents or wigwams near them. If the water for the horses is distant, only one-third must be watered at once; the same rule applies to forage. If there is any high corn or brush-wood in front of the post, some infantry may be placed in it, on the approach of an enemy, to gall his flanks; but there must be a bye path for their retreat. Ambuscades may also be posted in front of the piquets from time to time, who, firing upon the enemy's cavalry patrols, will teach them to keep at a more respectful distance; if they can be seconded by cavalry to make prisoners, it will be so much the better.

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page 181.

The commanding officer of an out-post sends out frequent patrols towards the enemy, and reports any intelligence which he has learned from them to the general officer commanding the out-posts, or the adjutant-general, in his daily report. From twelve to twenty dragoons will in general be sufficient for one of those patrols. If they have to pass through a wood which has not piquets at the other side, light infantry must be attached to them, who march on the flanks, and remain on the far side until the return of the dragoons from reconnoitring. If a wood in front of a post is not too

Lindenau,
page 129.

Turpin. extensive, infantry piquets should be posted at all the entrances at the other side, and cavalry on the plain in their front. If it is too extensive to push piquets beyond it, they must be posted at the entrances on the near side, and cavalry on the open ground in their rear; but if the near side is too near the post for the piquet, that is, too near for the purpose of previous information of an enemy's approach, they must be advanced into the wood without cavalry. If the post is on the side of a river where there is a ford or bridge, it must be fortified with a redoubt or fleche, and guarded by infantry sentries posted on the banks, and cavalry vedettes advanced at the other side.

When a detachment is obliged to retreat, the different arms mutually support each other; the cavalry cover the infantry on the plain, and the defiles are occupied and defended by the latter until the former have passed them; the artillery fire from every convenient situation. If a bridge is to be passed, the artillery and infantry first take post on the opposite banks of the river, and cover by their fire the retreat of the cavalry; but the bridge should not be destroyed without orders from the general; as its destruction might be an obstacle to retaking the post, or advancing patrols of discovery. It would be the means of preventing confusion, if the commanding officer communicated to those nearest to him in command, the order in which he meant to retreat, as soon as he had made his arrangements for the defence of his post.

A redoubt constructed for the defence of an out-
post

post should be open to the rear, to prevent it from being useful to the enemy, if taken, except it is so situated that he can turn it without being exposed to its fire. A church-yard may sometimes be easily converted into a redoubt, and the vaults would be safe magazines for the powder. A ditch should be dug round on the outside, and the earth thrown inwards to strengthen the wall, which should be reduced to four and a half feet high on the inside, by banquettes. Fleches should be built in front of each face, forming angles with the wall, of not more than 110, and not less than 90 degrees; their own jutting out angles should not have less than 60 degrees. Shells might be buried in front of the salient angles, or other weak parts, one or two feet under ground, to which trains of powder might be conveyed from the ditch by means of covered channels lined with wood.

The commanding, and all officers at an out-post, should conciliate the friendship of the inhabitants, as they may be the means of procuring useful intelligence: he should also endeavour to gain some of those in his front, who might give information to his patrols, and agree with them upon signals, by which to inform him of the motions of the enemy. The patrols should not go to the house of such inhabitant, but he should meet them at a place appointed. When there is any danger of their being intercepted, they should be ordered to return by a different route from that which they took going out, and parties sent to meet them.

A young officer should not be suffered to command

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page 122.

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page 132.

mand an out-piquet or patrole, until he has been several times on those duties with those of more experience. The commanding officer should be particular in instructing the officer who commands a patrole in the object of it, and the route he is to take, and order him to send back a dragoon when he has got three or four miles beyond the piquets : if the dragoon does not return within a reasonable time, it is to be presumed that the party is cut off, and an attack may be expected. The cavalry must therefore bridle up, the infantry stand to their arms, all the avenues be carefully patroled, and a report sent to the general.

When the army retreats, the officer commanding an out-post should redouble his vigilance, as the enemy will probably be more enterprising. His piquets should be withdrawn with silence and regularity, and the men be prevented from burning their wigwams, or making any sort of fires ; also, from plundering or ill treating the inhabitants, as their friendship (putting motives of humanity out of the question) may be of great advantage in case the army should again advance. It is almost unnecessary to add, that the out-posts should keep up a communication with each other by patroles or intermediate piquets. If the detachment has to retreat over a plain where there is danger of being attacked by a more numerous cavalry, it appears to me that the infantry would do well to provide themselves with stakes from six to seven feet long, pointed at both ends, which, planting diagonally before them, they would find a great defence against the charge of the enemy,

enemy, who, being repulsed by them, would be completely defeated by the dragoons.

When an out-post is occupied by both infantry and dragoons, the horses may be ventured in barns where the doors are wide, as the resistance of the infantry guards at the entrance will give them time to get out—but never in stables. If by cavalry only, they must be at piquet, and the men at their heads.

[Annexed is a Drawing, copied from Military Instructions, attributed to the King of Prussia, to illustrate the Position and Duty of Out-posts.]

PATROLES

ARE made from piquets, to keep their vedettes and sentries alert, to give notice of the approach of an enemy, and to keep up a communication with the piquets on the right and left: they consist of a non-commissioned officer, and three or four dragoons, on the plains and roads; and of light infantry, in woods and mountains, where the former cannot act. An officer generally accompanies them at sun-setting and dawn, and pushes forward as far as he can without risking to be cut off. If a road is to be passed by the patrole, a man must be previously detached to reconnoitre it minutely; but an infantry

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try patrol must not advance where it is liable to be attacked by cavalry.

If those small patrols see any thing of an enemy, a report is immediately sent to the officer commanding the piquet, by a well-mounted man, and the rest retreat; the non-commissioned officer halting to make further observations, whenever he can with safety.

A second class of patrols is made from an outpost, by order of its commanding officer: it consists of, from twelve to twenty dragoons; and is commanded by an officer, who inspects the arms, appointments, and ammunition of his party, and sees that his men have their necessary forage and provision. Before he marches off, he orders an advanced and rear guard, each consisting of three or four men: the advanced guard precedes the party twenty or thirty yards, and detaches one man a like distance in its front. They carry their carbines or pistols recovered. The rear guard marches in the same order, reversed, and faces to the rear at every halt: flankers are detached on the plain in the same manner. In a very broken intricate country, as in mountains, where frequent ravines and defiles occur, the first man should be advanced four or five hundred paces, and the other two or three, divide the ground between him and the party in such a manner that every man can see him who precedes him: the rear guard does the same. The party must march with great circumspection, halting at every defile until the first man has passed it, except where its length is such as to occasion

caſion too much delay. All roads and paths croſſing, or branching from the route which the party takes, muſt be carefully examined before they are paſſed, and intelligent men ſent to obtain a knowledge of their direction, not only leſt they ſhould conceal an enemy, but as they may ſerve for at leaſt ſome of the party to return home by, in the event of it being obliged to ſeparate, which nothing but abſolute neceſſity can excuſe. If the patrolle is to paſs through a village, an inhabitant muſt be taken out of the firſt houſe, and queſtioned before any of the party enter it; if it contains any of the enemy's infantry, it muſt be avoided by ſome circuitous rout; but ſhould he give information of a ſmall cavalry patrolle being in it, and that they are ſo negligent as not to have poſted a vedette outſide, they will be eaſily ſurpriſed: for this purpoſe the advanced guard muſt be called in, and the inhabitant being taken as a guide, the party enter the village in full gallop, cutting down every one who attempts to reſiſt or eſcape. Even ſhould there be a vedette, if he is ſo badly poſted or negligent that the party can enter the village cloſe at his heels, the ſurpriſe will be complete, and priſoners made, who may give uſeful information. The retreat muſt then be made without loſs of time; the priſoners diſarmed in front. Should the party be preſſed cloſely by the enemy, any horſes which cannot be preſerved from him muſt be diſabled or killed. Should a patrolle be obliged to paſs a hill, it halts until the advanced man has reconnoitred from the top. Should there be any wood-
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land or ravines, and no infantry attached to the party, two or three men must be dismounted to examine them minutely before the rest venture to enter.

Lindenau,
page 133.

A patrol is not sent out for the purpose of fighting, but that of gaining intelligence; therefore, an officer commanding one, must always keep in mind the object of his mission, and not go out of his road to attack or pursue any small party of the enemy, whose object may be to lead him into an ambuscade. But should he fall in with him in such a situation that he cannot well avoid him, nor form a judgment of his force, either on account of his local situation, a fog, or its being in the night, he should charge him without hesitation; if it is only a patrol, he will be sure to defeat it, though consisting of superior numbers: the party which attacks boldly having always a considerable advantage, but particularly in such a situation where the inferiority cannot be readily perceived. But as, contrary to expectation, the party so fallen in with may be the head of a strong column of the enemy advancing to attack our posts, and the patrol be cut off, the officer commanding it must be prepared for every event, and warn an intelligent dragoon not to mix in any conflict, but gallop back with the information which may have been already gained.

When a patrol comes to a place where two or more roads meet, the commanding officer halts, and detaches intelligent men to the most commanding situations to reconnoitre them: it is a principle

principle that patrols should see as much, and be seen as little as possible. Therefore high ground must be avoided by the party; but intelligent men detached to look out from it, in woody or intricate countries. When a patrol consists of cavalry and infantry, a proportion of the latter must march on the flanks, and examine minutely every ravine, &c. The rest march upon the road or path, preceded by one or two dragoons, with their carbines or pistols recovered, and followed by the cavalry; those advanced dragoons are flanked by infantry. The march is closed by a rear guard of infantry, followed by one or two dragoons at proper distances, who are also flanked by infantry. On the retreat, the order of march is the same reversed.

Lindenau,
page 129.

On arriving at the outward edge of the wood, the infantry take post, while the cavalry proceed to the nearest heights on the plain to reconnoitre. Should the latter be pressed by a superior force, the former cover their retreat through the woody country. They should keep themselves as much concealed as possible during the absence of the cavalry, and not appear to the pursuing enemy until they have given him their fire. If the patrol is to retreat by another route, the infantry march to it through the wood, or along its skirts, while the cavalry are reconnoitring the plain and roads in front; during which time they must conceal themselves as much as possible, and make no fires, but post sentries all round, keep a sharp look out, and detain any inhabitant who has seen them. A dragoon should

should be left with them to carry any information which may be necessary, whether to the cavalry or the post from which the patrol is detached. If attacked by cavalry when advancing, the infantry are formed on the side of the road; and having given a fire, the cavalry immediately charge while the infantry again gain the enemy's flank. If by both arms in superior force, the infantry cover the retreat of the cavalry through the thickets and intricate parts of the country, who in their turn form upon every open ground, and repel the enemy, until the infantry have gained some thicket or ravine in the rear: but, if the patrol having fulfilled its object, can make good its retreat without fighting, it will be much more to the credit of the officer who commands it. It may be necessary, for the safety of the party, to separate, the infantry retreating by bye paths, and the cavalry, in a trot on the road or plain—but they must never blow their horses by galloping.

Patroles of fifty, a hundred, or more dragoons are sent out by the general commanding the advanced guard, in an open country, and commanded by a field-officer or captain.—They are generally ordered to proceed by a certain route, and to a certain point.

The commanding officer of such a detachment would find understanding the language of the country, (or at least having some person who understands it with him) a very great advantage: he should stop and question every one he meets, and employ every possible method to gain intelligence; and

and at the same time use every precaution, for the security of his party, marching with an advanced, a rear guard, and flankers, at a sufficient distance to give him time to form on the approach of an enemy; those guards detach two or three men in their front and rear in the manner already directed for small patrols. At night or during a fog, a chain of communication is established between the advanced, rear guard, and the main-body, by means of single dragoons riding one after the other, so that each sees the man who precedes him; the same rule is observed with regard to the flankers. The commanding officer should not venture his party into any road or defile, until it has been passed and reconnoitred by his advanced guard. He should never dismount his men without first posting vedettes, and should observe the most advantageous situations in which to engage; should he find it impossible to avoid a conflict with a party of the enemy in superior force to him, to one of which he should retreat on first perceiving him. He must not enter any village with his party, until he has sent in a trusty non-commissioned officer or officers, and three or four men, to bring out one or two inhabitants whom he must question minutely; if it is necessary to pass through, in order to gain the wished-for information, and should it be occupied by a party of the enemy's cavalry, he must not hesitate in attacking them though somewhat superior to him in number; but the inhabitants who give the intelligence must be kept as a security for their veracity. The advanced guard

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endeavours to enter the village with the enemy's vedettes, the main body follows in a round trot, and the reserve remains outside to cover the retreat if necessary ; a place of rendezvous should be indicated to the whole, in case a separation should be unavoidable. It would be well to send parties to enter by different ways at the same time, if it could be done without detaching too much ; a few men should be left on the roads outside, to prevent the escape of the fugitives ; this being effected, the commanding officer advances with a few men to the most convenient situation for making his observations, which must be done as quickly as possible, the main body at the same time takes a position at the head of the village, to cover his retreat, and the rear guard with the prisoners remain behind it ; all the avenues must be carefully patrolled in his absence, so that no enemy can approach without timely notice being given to every part of the detachment, and every precaution be taken to prevent any inhabitant from leaving the village. The reconnoitring finished, the retreat must be made with all possible diligence, halting to feed only where the vedettes can command an extensive prospect, and even then only half the horses will be unbridled at once.

Seeing the piquets of the enemy, together with the information to be obtained from the inhabitants of the country, is as much as is generally expected from the parties here treated of. But it will be sometimes necessary for them to do more ; for instance, the general wishes to make prisoners,
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in order to compare their intelligence with that of his spies, or for any other purpose, and signifies his commands to the officer destined to command such a detachment, to advance by a particular route to the first enemy's piquet in that direction, and endeavour to cut it off, and make prisoners. The commanding officer must endeavour to gain intelligence on the march by questioning the inhabitants, but in such a manner as not to let them penetrate his intentions; if he finds one who seems well acquainted with the circumstances which he wants to be informed of, he takes him as a guide, guarding him carefully, but treating him with gentleness, promising to reward him if he gives good and true information: but threatening him with immediate death, should he deceive him. When he arrives at the distance of about a quarter of a mile from the vedettes, he halts the party, who keep the most profound silence while he advances accompanied by the guide and three or four dragoons, and endeavours to reconnoitre the piquet without being observed, he then makes his dispositions accordingly, detaching a party to fall on the rear by a *detour*, if possible, while the rest attack in front, but should the vedettes discover him when reconnoitring, he must not hesitate immediately attacking. If the rear of the piquet cannot be gained, he should form an ambuscade into which some of the piquet will be drawn by a feigned retreat, and endeavour to make prisoners; when his object being effected, he will immediately retreat before day light shall discover the smallness of his party.

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page 161.

If the enemy's position is to be ascertained, and he has a piquet posted on ground which may be supposed to command a view of the camp or out-posts, it must be immediately dislodged; if at night a small detachment should be detached to turn his flank and fall upon his rear, while the main body charge him in front, when being alarmed lest he should be surrounded and cut off, he will retreat, and leave the patrolling officer at liberty to effect his purpose. The fires burning at the enemy's out-posts, and at his grand guards in front of his camp, sufficiently denoting his situation, while the officer is making his observations he is covered by a chain of skirmishers, who divide the ground at the distance of 100 or 150 paces in his front, and on his flanks; the rear guard in the mean time keeps a sharp look out, and the main body remains a little behind him, ready for any emergency.

If the business is to be done by day-light, a small party follows the main body in the charge, *en echelon*, and wheels up at the moment of the shock, to turn the enemy's flank; the officer then, besides his general observation of the position, reconnoitres the nearest post minutely, and takes down his remarks in writing if he has time.

But if the patrolle can slip between the piquets of the enemy, by some path which has been neglected by him: the officer must (having made his observations) endeavour to retreat out of the chain before day; but if he finds that impracticable, he should conceal his party in a wood, and at a distance

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tance from the road, till night; he should post sentries in the trees to look out, and dismounted dragoons round, as well to prevent the men from straggling, as to resist on foot in case the party should be attacked. This is a perilous situation; perhaps it would be better to endeavour to escape by attacking some of the piquets in the rear and cutting your way through them.

If the situation from which the enemy is to be reconnoitred, is in a woody country, the patrolle will probably consist of both arms. In order to drive the enemy's piquets from it, the infantry attack the flanks in the wood, while the dragoons clear the road; if there is a ditch across it, the dragoons do not advance until the infantry have driven the guard from it, who will certainly retreat as soon as its flank is gained. Having cleared the ground from which he is to reconnoitre, the officer forms a chain of infantry advanced 500 or 600 paces in front and on his flanks, which keeps the enemy at a distance by its fire: these infantry cover themselves as they can from the fire of the enemy; the rest of the party are put out of the reach of musketry, and keep a sharp look out to the rear and flanks, posting guards, and patrolling any roads by which the enemy might approach.

The officer in advancing through the country should take particular notice of every inch of ground, and attack and defend it in imagination, posting both cavalry and infantry in the most advantageous situations for their reciprocal support; so that should he fall in with a party of the enemy

Lindenau,
page 148.

Bosroger,
page 131.

on his return, he should be immediately able, and without the least hesitation, to form his arrangement and put it in execution.

A patrole, when pressed by an enemy in its retreat, should endeavour to gain a wood or defile in its rear, as the enemy will not venture to pursue it into such a place, without taking precautions which will delay him, and give us time to gain a great deal of ground; however, if he should venture at once through it, the party should face about at the other side, and charge him before he can form. If small parties of infantry have been left to guard the entrances of the defiles, the retreat will be secure.

Some writers recommend mounting infantry behind dragoons on patroles; but it should never be done except on very particular occasions indeed, as it would render the horses unable to act. The French practised it very much this war.

An officer commanding a patrole, should never halt in any village, nor suffer any of his men to enter into houses; if they are in need of refreshment, some steady men are sent under a serjeant or quarter-master to procure it.

When a patrole comes to a wood, which is likely to be occupied by the enemy, the infantry advance through it, and the cavalry remain formed on the plain ready to cover their retreat. No safe opportunity of feeding the horses should be missed on the patrole, as it answers the double purpose of refreshing them, and lightening their load; but the

the forage must be œconomized, so as to last during the time which the party is to remain out.

It is a maxim, that in retreating, infantry always form to occupy the entrance of a defile, and cavalry at the other side having passed it. Military Instructions,
page 240.

When it is an object with an officer to cut off a patrol of the enemy (which must depend upon his orders) he should, if superior to him, endeavour to conceal that advantage from him, to draw him into an advantageous situation by retreating before him, while he detaches a party by a *detour* to cut off his retreat. If the patrol is a mixed one, the local situation of course will determine whether the party detached will consist of cavalry or infantry, or of both; but if the enemy is superior, and a conflict cannot be avoided, the commanding officer must decide at once and form his party, not omitting any local advantage whatsoever, but above all things securing a retreat: in such a situation his character and existence depend upon his coolness and presence of mind. Our light dragoons being mounted on so much stronger horses than any others, can always cope with very superior numbers of any enemy, if equally officered. Mauvillion,
page 54.

An officer commanding an advanced or flanking party on a march of the army, and falling in with a patrol of the enemy, immediately sends a report to the general, and endeavours to cut it off, that it may not carry home the intelligence of our movement, at all events he must keep it at such a distance as to prevent it from forming any judgment of our force.

An officer going on any detached duty, should examine the appointments and amunition of his party before he marches off, and see that his men have a proper quantity of forage and provisions.

All officers, but particularly of light troops, should spare no pains nor expence to acquire an accurate knowledge of the country which is the seat of war; they should procure the best maps, and from them construct more particular ones on a large scale, which is done in the following manner.

After having marked on the map, the place where you are as centre, you describe a circle of six or eight miles. You then trace on paper another circle five or six times larger, but still supposed to be six or eight miles; its diameter divided will serve as a scale for placing exactly the towns, villages, &c. laid down within the circumference traced upon the map. You then ascertain by enquiry if the distances in your map are right, and if not, you correct them: by enquiry and your own observations you will also be able to fill up the spaces between the towns, villages, &c. to trace the course of the rivers and rivulets, the position of hills, woods, morasses, &c. and to mark all the bye roads which are not laid down in the general map.

In order to lay down the bearings of the places contained in his map, the officer should be provided with a pocket compass, without which he should never go on a patrol, as without it in some countries it will be impossible to find his way; for instance,

instance, in a flat open country, where all the objects which present themselves resemble one another, or in a wood.

An officer making a patrol should note in his pocket book, the features of the country through which he passes, and detail them to his commanding officer, if required, on his return—this is easily done as follows :

Patrol from the village A, to the town N. At one mile distance the road descends, on the right is a wood, on the left a vineyard. At two miles is the village of——, through which runs a rivulet (fordable or not for cavalry) over which you pass on a (stone or wooden) bridge, at the other side is the same valley. At three miles the road ascends and divides itself in two; on the right are ploughed fields, on the left a hill covered with vines. At four miles distance is the village B, containing about 60 or 70 houses, it is of difficult access, surrounded with gardens, hedges and other inclosures. At five miles the ground is even to the right, low and boggy on the left, covered with brushwood. At six miles the ground is boggy; on the right about a mile from the road is the village of C; on the left a heath of two or three miles extent. At seven miles begins a great forest, the wood not thick, but the road very bad. At eight miles is the town of N, surrounded by an old wall, and contains about 500 houses.

This is sufficient to explain the method, which is within the capacity of any corporal.

Concerning

*Concerning the manner of Reporting; extracted
from Military Instructions, attributed to FRE-
DERICK the Great.*

VERBAL reports being often inaccurately delivered, it is always most advisable to send them written; for this reason, an officer on duty should never be without paper and pencil in his pocket; in cases that require immediate dispatch, you may send a verbal report first, which you ought to confirm by a written one as soon as possible.

In all reports you must endeavour to be explicit, yet concise, and without any other title at the top, than the place, the day and the hour.

An officer upon an out-command, after having reported facts and appearances, may be permitted to subjoin his conjecture concerning the intentions of the enemy, and may also indicate the manner in which he proposes to act.

All reports should be sealed; but where dispatch is required, they should not be retarded on that account. Officers should accustom themselves to write reports without dismounting. Officers for their own credit should be very careful how they report things of which they are not sufficiently informed, and ought by no means to omit contradicting their intelligence as soon as they discover their mistake.

The Conduct of an Officer sent out to Reconnoitre with a Command, consisting of Infantry, Dragoons, and Hussars.

Military
Instructions,
page 239.

THE hussars, who are to reconnoitre on both sides of the road as they proceed, are to be advanced about a quarter of a league before the cavalry; which, if in an open country, must march in the centre, followed by the infantry, also at the distance of a quarter of a league.

If the enemy is encamped in an open country, it is better to traverse the plain with your cavalry only, and to post your infantry at the last defile, ready to stop the enemy, in case your cavalry should be pursued in the retreat.

If after having marched a considerable distance you perceive nothing of the enemy, and that it is necessary you should penetrate a wood, or pass a defile, in order to have a view of his situation, though it may be attended with some danger; in this case you halt your cavalry in the plain, and pass the wood or defile with your infantry only; your cavalry will form, in the mean time, ready to cover the infantry in case of a precipitate retreat. It is an invariable rule for cavalry to rally behind a defile, not before it. If you take care to secure the passes as you proceed with small guards of infantry, there is no danger of suffering in your retreat.

Military
Instructions,
page 241.

On Military Deception.

HAPPENING to fall in with a party of the enemy of superior force, it is often more advisable to stand your ground than to make a precipitate retreat: your apparent resolution will stagger the enemy; and by carefully magnifying your party, you may probably persuade him to move off.

In the first place you must extend your line by ordering your rear rank to double, and form upon one wing, while the other must be so situated as to turn upon some wood or inclosure, so that its extremity may not appear. You will march a couple of horses between each division, which will appear to draw your field pieces.*

Your cavalry must form a rank entire, with a couple of files upon each flank of two deep; but nothing will deceive the enemy so effectually as your seeming resolution to engage. In the mean time you must detach part of your infantry to secure the nearest defile in your rear; the rest may then move off gradually, with orders to quicken their pace as soon as they have got out of sight of the enemy; and having given them sufficient time to reach the defile, your cavalry may retire as expeditiously as they please.

* The infantry are here supposed to be three deep; but were they only two deep, the line might be extended by taking away half the men from the rear rank, and leaving the other half to cover only every second man of the front rank.

The Duty of an Officer commanding a Detachment of Hussars or Dragoons, posted in a Village near the Army, whether encamped or in Cantonments.

THESE detachments being posted for the security of the army, the commanding officer will take every imaginable precaution to prevent surprize.— Having received orders to take post in such a village, his first care must be to cause it to be reconnoitred; but before his people enter the village, he is to post a small party at the opposite side, to prevent the inhabitants from carrying intelligence to the enemy: in the mean time, till his patrols return, he may feed his horses and refresh his men, but without suffering any of them to stir from their horses.

If, from the report of his patrols, he finds any unexpected defect in his position, he halts till he has reported the particulars, and his opinion of it, to the general.

Having taken post in the village, he should take such precautions for his security, that when his horses are unfaddled, he may have a quarter of an hour's notice of the approach of an enemy; but, if faddled, eight minutes previous notice should be sufficient.

It is not expected that a hussar should defend his post against a superior force, as in this situation his duty is to observe and amuse the enemy. The service

vice he is to render depends rather upon the disposition than the strength of his piquets, which ought to form a continued chain, so as to make it impossible for the enemy to approach without being observed.

Plate I.

In the annexed Plate, there are three different stations:—No. 1. is a village, distant a * quarter of mile from the left wing of the army which is encamped near the town A C. In this village I have posted four squadrons of hussars. Upon the left runs a rivulet, over which there are three bridges, *a*, *b*, and *c*; *a* and *b* having no communication with each other. The right flank is covered by the posts No. 2 and 3. At *a*, I post a serjeant and six men, who, having broken the bridge, posts his vedettes so as to observe every thing that passes on the opposite side, and patrols constantly along the banks of the rivulet. This out-guard is detached from one, consisting of an officer and twenty men, at *d*, which relieves it every four hours.

This officer sends out constant patrols, and reports to the commanding officer in the village.

I post another of those out-guards at *b*, and also at *c*, which differ only from the first in that there is a village at the other side of the rivulet, of which the enemy may possibly take possession, therefore I post a vedette on the height beyond the village, whom I withdraw at night, taking up a few planks of the bridge. As often as this piquet hears any unusual noise in the village, such as barking of dogs, &c.

* A German mile is about five English.

the sergeant must report it to the officer from whose party he is detached. These two piquets, which have a communication with each other, are detached from, and supported by the detachment *e*, which consists of 38 men, under similar orders as that at *d*. In this situation, when the patrols have passed the bridge, it should be guarded by light infantry or dismounted hussars, who are to take up the planks as soon as the patrols have re-passed.

Our flank being secured by No. 2 detachment, let us consider the precautions necessary to be taken in the village.

Each entrance should be barricaded by ladders fastened to pikes drove into the ground, or by traverses; but the road by which you mean to advance by waggons only, loaded with dung, which may be easily removed, which, in case of necessity, may serve as a parapet, behind which, to make a good defence; you will post at each entrance a corporal and four men, and the reserve in the centre of the village. If there should not be a sufficient number of barns in the village, part of your horses must stand in the open air, it being by no means advisable to crowd horses into stables, the doors of which will admit only one at a time. Your horses must be saddled at sun-set, at which time the reserve turns out.

Those who have been permitted to unsaddle their horses, must take care that their appointments are so placed that they may find them in the dark. It is a fault to fatigue your people without cause; therefore,

fore, if you have any heights in your neighbourhood, you may ease the corps by diminishing the piquets and vedettes in the day time, in clear weather. If you have infantry, you will post them so as to defend the entrance of the village till your hussars are ready to receive the enemy ; in this case your horses may be unfaddled in the day time.

No. 2 is a village on the plain, whose left is covered by No. 1, and its right by No. 3, and a morass, the front is entirely open. In the village, I will suppose, you have posted four or six squadrons. —The post A is occupied by a captain and forty, and B by a subaltern and thirty : they detach small parties to C, D and E, who communicate with each other by patrols. Those detachments, on the first attack, fall back on the piquets from which they were advanced, who must also retire to the village, should the enemy appear formidable. On the other side of the village I post an officer and twenty-eight men at F, who detaches a serjeant and eight to G.

Posts of this nature are considerably strengthened by a mixture of infantry, and even a few field pieces, which are placed at the entrance of the village in the day time, and in the church-yard at night.

At No. 3 is a village near a wood, through which are several roads : here I post two piquets at *a a*, and *b b*, which are to send out frequent patrols, and to continue mounted all night.

It is unnecessary to guard the entrance of this
village,

village, as it may be approached on every side. If you have no infantry, it would be better to retire into the plain during the night. A party of light infantry would be very useful, if properly posted in the wood; but their retreat over the plain would be extremely difficult.

Conduct of the Commander of a Regiment, Squadron, or Detachment of Hussars in Winter Quarters.

THE disposition within his quarters is the same as before directed; but as neither men nor horses can continue any time in the open air in that season, he should have a small detachment of infantry ready to amuse the enemy till the hussars have time to bring out their horses and mount: those infantry are quartered at the extremities of the village, where they throw up fleches or redoubts for their security.

As in winter, there are some morasses which do not freeze sufficiently to support your patrols of hussars, but which are passable for the enemy's infantry, you should send out frequent patrols of infantry in the night, during the frost.

[End of the Extracts from Military Instructions by the King of Prussia.]

F O R A G I N G.

THOUGH with great armies in Europe this duty is generally entrusted to a general officer, when it is to be performed in the front, or on the flanks of the army, in order to spare the country in the rear; yet in our service we are so much divided into corps, particularly in the colonies, that it must often devolve upon those of less elevated rank; it may therefore not be amiss to say a few words upon this subject.

Turpin. The detachment for the protection of the foragers should, if possible, march some hours before them, and form a chain of posts of cavalry and infantry, through which nothing can pass, either in or out, without being seen. Those posts should send out patrols of dragoons, and post vedettes in the situations commanding the most extensive prospects, while parties of light infantry examine carefully all ravines, thickets, high corn, &c. &c. The commanding officer (if the chain is extensive) should divide his force; but if not, should establish himself with the main body in the most convenient situation for supporting all its parts. He should not, however, be in too great haste to advance with all his force to the assistance of any of his posts, but merely to send such reinforcements as appear necessary, as the enemy would probably make a false attack for the purpose of drawing him away from the point at which he meant to penetrate. Every precaution

precaution being taken, the foraging begins. If the forage is green, four men may be employed to one horse; one holds him, another cuts the forage, and the other two bind and load. The foragers may be sent home in detachments with officers or quarter-masters, as fast as they finish their business.

Mauvillion,
page 470.

The quantity that each horse carries, and the average rate of each truss, should be specified in orders, to which the officers must be particularly attentive: they must also see that they are tight, and not too large. A waggon will employ ten men, besides the drivers, three of whom cut the forage, six bind and load, and one packs it on the waggon.

If the forage is dry, villages, streets, hamlets, and farm-houses are assigned to the different corps, and the quantity which they are to deliver, is given in writing to the commanding officer, and also marked with chalk on the doors by the commissary's assistants, or the quarter-masters. The quantity which each sack is to contain, should be also specified in orders.

An officer entrusted with a command against a forage, should keep in his mind, upon this as well as every other occasion, the main object for which he is detached—which (on the service now treated of) is, to defeat the purpose of the enemy, by preventing him from foraging.

To this end, he should be perfectly acquainted with the intention and movements of the enemy, as his must be regulated by them. He should know

Mauvillion,
page 505.

the time and place of the forage, and the number of troops which are to protect it. If the country is such as will admit of it, he should make several false attacks at the same time that he makes his real one; and wherever he breaks through the chain, some dragoons should immediately fall on the foragers, disperse them, and seize as many horses, &c. as possible.

If the enemy makes his retreat in good order, having first sent off the foragers, he should be followed a sufficient distance to prevent them from returning to their work that day; but if he should keep his ground, in spite of every effort to drive him from it, he still should be kept in a state of alarm, to prevent the foraging as much as possible; but the officer who commands the detachment should remember, that a reinforcement may arrive from the enemy's camp, and therefore be on his guard against such an event.

As green forage is generally collected on a plain, cavalry are sent to prevent it; but not, however, without some infantry to support them. If the enemy is so incautious that an ambuscade can be formed, he will be easily defeated. But against dry foraging in villages, infantry are supported by a few dragoons. The officers and quarter-masters commanding the foragers, must be very attentive to prevent straggling or waste, and to preserve good order and sobriety, as upon such occasions more men are lost by irregularity than any thing else.

The gentlemen of the quarter-master-general's, and commissary's departments, should make themselves

selves acquainted with the average produce of the land in the country, where the army is to act, so that when ordered to reconnoitre that where the forage is to be collected, they may have nothing to do but to measure the fields, by pacing their horses along two sides of them, which being multiplied the one by the other, gives the surface, and the average produce being known, and one third allowed for failure, waste, &c. they are assigned to the different corps according to their strength.

The gentlemen of those departments, and dragoon officers, should also be able to judge, by measuring them, the quantity of grain, hay and straw contained in the stacks or barns.

C O N V O Y S.

AS the loss of a convoy must be productive of the greatest inconvenience to the troops, for which it was intended, too much attention cannot be paid to this subject; and, where it is liable to be attacked, there is no service which requires more attention and address than the conduct of one.

Lindsay, from
Templehoff,
page 216.

When we consider the length of road which a hundred waggons will require, and the time which it takes to park them—what must be the difficulty of defending the march of some thousands. One hundred waggons, with four horses to each, in one row or column, with very small intervals, will extend an English mile, allowing fifteen paces for a waggon and horses; waggons with eight horses will

cover one third more. In order not to fatigue the cattle unnecessarily, the convoy should be divided into brigades: suppose one thousand waggons in five brigades of two hundred each, have orders to march at one o'clock, and that they can march at the rate of two miles an hour, as each brigade of two hundred waggons, with four horses to each, covers two miles of road, the second brigade cannot move in less than an hour after the first; and if they have all harnessed and put to at the same time, the fifth brigade will have remained so for four hours without moving, which time would have been better spent in refreshing the men and horses.*

For the further preservation of the cattle, the brigades might change places every day: for instance, the first leads to-day; the second to-morrow, and so on, as those who lead find the roads good and unbroken; but when some hundreds of waggons have passed, those in the rear will find them very bad. If a waggon breaks down, it is drawn to one side, not to interrupt the line of march.

Mauvillion,
page 494.

Before the convoy an advanced guard is sent forward; its strength is regulated by that of the escort, and its composition by the nature of the country. Its infantry occupy all the defiles through which the convoy is to pass, or by which the enemy might approach, and its cavalry guard the plains. Patroles are sent forward as far as they can go

* Therefore each brigade should harness an hour after that which precedes it.

without

without too much risk, to examine the country minutely.

A part of the escort marches at the head of the convoy, and furnishes detachments to relieve those left by the advanced guard on the flanks. Those detachments are successively relieved by the rear-guard, which they join. A reserve marches with the centre to support any part which may be attacked. When the escort has relieved all the detachments left on the flanks by the advanced guard, and the rear guard all those of the escort, the waggons should be drawn up, and parked; and the detachments which have been relieved sent to the corps with which they sat out. When that is done, the convoy may again proceed as before.

But it will be impossible, with a small escort, to protect such a line of march as a convoy must occupy, unless we have sufficient previous information of the point which is menaced.

For this purpose we must take care—First, That all the detached parties from the advance, rear and flank guards, do proceed a sufficient distance towards the enemy, to give us timely notice of his approach; so that the waggons may be parked, and the escort formed to the best advantage before they can fall upon us; for which purpose, the detachments already mentioned are to oppose, and retard his march as much as possible, until they receive orders to retreat. Turpin.

Secondly, That when we come to a defile, the waggons must be drawn up and parked, until our patrols having advanced, and examined to a confi-

derable distance, report that all is safe. When a sufficient proportion of the escort having occupied the other side, the convoy may again drive forward; arrived at the other side the defile, the waggons are again parked until the remainder of the escort has passed, when they again drive on. The leading waggon should be frequently halted to prevent the line of march from extending; and whenever the breaking down of a waggon, a defile, the badness of the road, or a hill, causes a halt at the head of the convoy, those waggons that follow should drive up and be parked at the side of the road, so that the rear waggons will still continue advancing.—The horses may be taken from those waggons which are parked, to assist the leaders to pass the obstacle. Whenever the convoy halts for repose, the waggons should be driven up, and parked in the form of a square or oblong, within which the horses are placed; and the escort is posted between it and the enemy, at some defile, or other advantageous situation. It may be even necessary for the infantry of the escort to take post behind the waggons, when parked; but that would be a very dangerous situation. In some circumstances, it would be prudent to sacrifice a part for the preservation of the rest; but a defile between the convoy and the enemy will be the surest protection. It is evident, that where danger is not to be apprehended, some of those precautions would only retard the march.

Attack of a Convoy.

IF an ambuscade can be formed with effect, it will be the best mode of attack, either against a convoy, or any other moving body: but in the present improved state of the military art, it is almost impossible that it should succeed. The troops of which it is composed should be posted at such a distance from the road which the convoy is to pass, that they may not be perceived by the enemy; for if his patrols do their duty, no cover can conceal them: they should, nevertheless, be sufficiently near to fall upon the escort before it can be formed, and the waggons parked. The ambuscade has its outposts and sentries, who keep as quiet and concealed as possible; detain every person passing, and cut off every party of the enemy which may have seen them; but those who have not perceived them, are not molested.

Mauvillion,
page 510.

All attacks upon convoys should be made with the greatest vivacity, and at different points at the same time, to create the more confusion. Wherever any troops penetrate, parties should be detached to do as much mischief as possible to the convoy. Over-turning a few waggons on the road, may be the means of cutting off those in their rear.

Trifling disadvantages of ground or numbers, should not prevent the attack of a convoy, as much is to be gained, and nothing lost, in case of a repulse;

repulse; the commandant being too well satisfied with the preservation of the convoy to think of a pursuit. The officer entrusted with the command of the troops who are to attack, should have a perfect knowledge of the ground, and the time that the convoy is to pass. His march should be conducted with all imaginable secrecy, detaching his advanced and flanking parties no farther than is absolutely necessary for his security.

DETACHMENTS.

AN officer, detached to any considerable distance from the army, should, above all things, take care of his communication, and the subsistence of his detachment: he should preserve the strictest discipline, and suffer no straggling or marauding; he should march with advanced, flanking, and rear-guards, proportioned to his force; he should never pass a defile without first having reconnoitred it, and ascertained that he cannot be attacked before he has time to form at the other side. When passed, he should halt the head of the column, to prevent it from lengthening. He should never halt without taking the usual precautions—as posting pickets, vedettes, &c. and choosing a situation where fuel and water can be easily procured, and which his detachment can act in, to advantage, if attacked.

If an officer observes these rules, and is of a cool,
but

but decided character, he may be unfortunate, but never can be dishonoured.









I shall now close this little treatise, with observing, that originally, it was not intended to exceed a few rules for piquets and patroles, for the use of the officers of the 8th Light Dragoons: but, that a love of employment, and the leisure which I had in country quarters, induced me to prolong it to its present extent. If it can be of any use, by occasioning some person, better qualified, to improve upon it, I shall not think that my time has been mispent.

Explanation of Plate II.

A, B, the camp, having its out-posts in a country, partly woody, partly open and partly enclosed.—At No. I. are posted two squadrons of light dragoons, and 400 infantry, who furnish the following piquets.—At the cottage *a*, is an officer and 36 men; he detaches eight men under a non-commissioned officer to *c*, on the bridle road, and four men on each of the paths to *d* and *e*, and posts two sentinels at *f*, on the path leading to the great road in front of the village.—At *b*, are twelve dragoons under his command, who patrol the bridle road in his front, and cover his retreat over the open ground to the village.—At *g*, is a captain and fifty men; he detaches an officer and 20 men to *h*, and a corporal and six men to each of the paths, *i* and *k*, and two sentinels to the path *f*.—At *l*, is a serjeant and twelve dragoons to communicate with the post No. II.—At *m*, is an officer and 20 dragoons, who may be retired behind the infantry at night, leaving vedettes.—At *n*, is a field work, to which the infantry retreat when forced from the village.

No. II. is occupied by two squadrons of light dragoons, and 100 light infantry. An officer and 30 dragoons are posted at *p*; this officer posts a small party in his front, and takes care that his flank vedettes can see those belonging to the piquets of No. I. and No. III.—A serjeant and twelve dragoons are posted at *q*, to communicate with No. I. The infantry post small guards at the entrances of the village.—No. III. having a plain in its rear has no infantry, although the country in front of it is enclosed; but is occupied by four squadrons of light dragoons.—A captain and 60 men are posted at *r*; he posts a subaltern and 20 men behind the village in his front at *s*, and a subaltern and 20 men on the bridle road at *t*, who also posts a small party in his front.—A subaltern and 30 men are posted on the plain at *u*, and another and 20 men at the bridle road at *v*; they post small parties in their front who remain bridled.—No. IV. is a field work to defend a bridge, *w* the infantry posted in it, *L*, light cavalry to support them, and cover their retreat; *x*, a piquet of infantry on the bridge; *y*, small piquets of infantry upon the banks of the river in the enclosed fields; *z*, a piquet of cavalry to watch by its vedettes the bank where the country is open; *B*, a piquet of light dragoons on the other side of the river.

The officer who commands in a redoubt, should have a reserve of a third or fourth of his men to fill up the places of the killed, to carry ammunition to those who are engaged, and to reinforce that part where the attack is hottest. He who attacks it orders a part of his men to jump into the ditch; if necessary, they are provided with hatchets to cut down the pallisadoes, and open a way while the rest fire from the glacis. Carriage

	Carriage Road.
	Bridle Road.
	Foot Paths.
	River.
	Farm-House or Cottage.
	Village.
	Cavalry.
	Infantry.
	Abatis.
	Traverse.
	Vedette.
	Sentinel.

Explanation of Plate III. and IV.

The first representing the March of a Convoy in an enclosed Country.—The last over a Plain.

PLATE III.

- a.* The convoy parked.
- b.* The convoy on its march.
- c.* The escort.
- d.* The advanced guard.
- e.* The rear guard.
- f.* Parties of infantry guarding the passes.
- g.* Parties of cavalry patrolling in their front.
- h.* A place fixed upon for halting the convoy.

PLATE IV.

- a.* The convoy parked.
- b.* The convoy on its march.
- c.* The escort.
- d.* The advanced guard.
- e.* The rear guard.
- f.* Small detachments of Infantry posted by the escort at 400 paces distant from each other, to defend the convoy.
- g.* Small parties of cavalry in front of them, and covering their intervals.
- h.* Parties of dragoons reconnoitring on the plain.

N. B. Colonel Templehoff recommends that a convoy should not extend more than five miles, and that it should be halted at that distance, until the last waggon is driven up.

He supposes the escort to consist of 10,000 men. With a smaller escort, the halts will be proportionably more frequent.

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TO THE

R E A D E R.

I HAVE already said, that *I* wrote the Rules, here proposed, for the conduct of small detachments in the field, originally, for the use of the officers of the 8th Light Dragoons.—*I*, therefore, as they could always refer to me, refrained from any argument or explanation on the subject: but the favourable terms in which some officers of reputation have expressed their opinion of the Treatise, have induced me to offer it to the Public; and to add, by way of illustration, a short sketch of the general principles of the Art of War—which apply equally to all military bodies, whether great or small; and upon which all officers, who would obtain reputation for themselves, and advantage for their country, must conduct themselves.

Let it not be supposed that, in treating of the military art, *I* presume to give instructions to my superiors, or pretend to be master of my subject—far from it: but as History is too silent on the actions of that class of officers for whom *I* write, we must endeavour to form ourselves upon the model of those to whom she has dedicated her pen; and by studying the
manner

manner in which they conducted armies, learn to command detachments.

However deficient this little work, and others of the same sort may be, they may have one good effect—that of exciting the curiosity of young officers, and inducing them to study authors worthy their attention.

An idea, very pernicious to the service, is but too prevalent—that study is unnecessary for a military man. It is true, that it is not necessary towards his admission, nor even to his obtaining the highest rank in the army; but if he possesses the laudable ambition (from which no man should be exempt) of rising to honourable fame—a soldier's only reward—there is no profession (not even those which are called learned) which requires study more than that of arms.

The *Art of War*, (says the author of the *Panegyrick of Marshal Saxe*) “forms a vast and complicated science, composed of a great number of sciences, united and chained together, which mutually support each other, and from which a single link cannot be detached without interrupting the chain.”

So sensible was that great General of this, that, after having served many campaigns, and arrived at the rank of Major-General, “he gave himself up entirely to the study of those serious and profound sciences which are become the associates and ministers of war. The *Elements of Euclid* taught him the general properties of space and figure, to calculate the proportion of their different parts, and to give them that spirit of combination which is the foun-

“ foundation of every art, which is not governed by
 “ the imagination, equally necessary to a General
 “ and an Astronomer, and which formed a Turenne
 “ and a Vauban, as well as an Archimedes and a
 “ Newton. Adding to this the study of History, with
 “ an exact knowledge of Geography, he observed,
 “ and formed himself by the example of the great
 “ men who had preceded him.”

To him we owe, in a great degree, the present system of tactics, since brought to perfection by Frederick the Great, and lately introduced into the British army by the patriotic exertions of Lieutenant-General Dundas.

In favour of the above destructive opinion, I have heard the successes of the French armies this war adduced; but which, in my opinion, are rather arguments against it. A man who has received a liberal education, or who has been bred to any learned profession, can easily apply himself afterwards to those sciences most necessary for that line to which his interest or inclination may lead him.—He who has been educated for a Lawyer may, without much difficulty, qualify himself for a Physician; and he who has received the education, which the accomplished Soldier ought to have, is equally fit (as far as learning goes) for any other profession. Do not we see an Erskine, after having tried the Navy and the Army, triumph in a profession, where abilities alone were sufficient to raise him to fame and fortune.

The officers who have figured in the service of the French convention, were either lawyers, (a class, who, in every country, are obliged to receive a liberal edu-
 F cation)

cation) or else officers de genie—Engineers and Artillery, a corps in which they had every opportunity of studying the mathematical and mechanical parts of the profession: and as the revolution opened a field to their ambition, it is natural to suppose that it would cause an extention of their researches, and History would not refuse her aid.

With respect to the inferior officers, there could not be much difficulty in supplying them, when we know that, according the custom of the French service, every man was entitled to his discharge at the expiration of five years, that it was easily procured sooner, that, consequently, many enlisted for a frolick; or to learn to ride, fence and dance, GRATIS: and, finally, that it was considered as a feather to have served.

This will be a sufficient answer to those who argue from the analogy of the French successes, that numbers alone can do every thing, as they were able at once to form an army of trained soldiers.

I have heard the great Duke of Marlborough adduced as an instance, that study is unnecessary for an officer, as he was the most ignorant man of his day: but, by the same rule, it must be unnecessary for a politician, for he was certainly the best of the age; and if he really was that ignorant man, we must allow that genius's do now and then appear who are created to surmount all difficulties.

No man will undertake to make a pair of shoes without having taken some pains to learn his trade; yet we see some who do not hesitate to occupy situations, where, not only their own reputation, but
the

the lives of many of their fellow creatures depend upon their professional knowledge, without having ever once thought of qualifying themselves, foolishly supposing that bravery is the only requisite of an officer.

Experience is allowed to be a good guide in every profession; then why should we neglect to take advantage of that of our predecessors, to copy their achievements, and take warning by their faults?

The Lawyer founds his plea, and the Judge his decision on the opinions of a Blackstone, a Camden, or a Mansfield. The Minister pursues the politics of a Richelieu, a Fleury, a Walpole, or a Chatham. The Physician too improves by the practice of his predecessors: and will the Soldier alone rush into the desert without a guide or compass, and presumptuously disdain to profit by the talents and experience of a Gustavus Adolphus, a Maurice of Nassau, a Spinola, a Turenne, a Marlborough, a Marshal Saxe, a Ferdinand, and a Frederick.

It is, (after a competent knowledge of the military sciences) by carefully studying the History of those, and other great men, together with their orders, that an Officer is to be formed either to command a detachment or an army.

Let us now endeavour to trace some of the principal outlines of the Art of War, as practised by them.

the lives of many of their fellow creatures depend upon their professional knowledge, without having ever once thought of qualifying themselves, possibly supposing that the way is the only requisite of an

experience is allowed to be a good guide in every profession; they only should be taught to take advantage of that of our predecessors, to copy their

achievements, and make nothing of their faults? The lawyer, I think, his plea, and the Judge his decision on the questions of a Black, one, a Christian, and a slave. The Minister preaches the politics of a Methodist, a Presbyterian, or a Baptist. The Physician too, for instance, by the practice of his profession; and with the Soldier comes with into the field without a guide or compass, and prescribes only upon to fight by the talents and experience of a General, a Marshal, a Minister of State, a Bishop, a Jesuit, a Methodist, a Presbyterian, a Baptist, a Quaker, a Unitarian, and a Pious.

It is, for instance, knowledge of the military science, by carefully studying the History of their and other great men, together with their orders, that an Officer is to be trained either to command a detachment or an army.

Let us now endeavour to trace some of the principal outlines of the Art of War, as presented to them.

ART OF WAR.

EVERY one knows that an army consists of cavalry, infantry, artillery and engineers: I shall briefly proceed to explain their different uses; beginning with the infantry, as the great body of the army.

It is divided into regular (or infantry of the line) and light infantry. In general the light infantry, in the German services, are only raised for the war; they are composed of game keepers, and armed with rifles. Our light infantry companies attached to regiments, are neither trained nor armed for the sort of service for which troops of that denomination are intended.

As every individual, so has every body of men its chief strength, either for attack or defence, in front. Therefore every body of soldiers should be always so situated as to be able to oppose a front to the enemy.

First principle.

The infantry forces its enemy to retreat by its fire, or charging him with the bayonet. The latter is but seldom practised, though peculiarly adapted to the British infantry.

Modes of fighting of the infantry.

The infantry is divided into battalions (in our service) of 800 rank and file, the flank companies being detached, which particularly if formed only two deep seem to be too extensive a front. In the Prussian service a battalion consists of only 700

Distribution of the infantry.

men including officers and music; and their grenadiers of only 520 privates, and they form three deep.

Use of infantry.

As infantry can be used with effect in all sorts of ground, it may be looked upon as the soul of an army; but it must not be exposed to cavalry on a plain, as it would certainly be destroyed, at least as soon as it was attempted to be put in motion. But in broken ground, such as mountains, woods, villages, behind hedges, ditches, rivers, morasses, and all sorts of fortifications, it is equally useful either for attack or defence.

Upon hills, infantry should be so posted as to be able to defend the declivity by its fire, not quite upon the summit, much less behind it, as it would thereby be prevented from repelling the attacking enemy. Infantry in a wood should be posted so as to be covered by the trees, and at the same time able to fire upon the approaching enemy, or in the open parts behind abatis's.

In villages, when it is sufficiently numerous, infantry takes post behind the hedges and walls of the outward gardens which look towards the country. When driven from those, it retires from hedge to hedge always occupying the gardens, houses and streets, or roads which come within its line.

Battle of Norlingen, August 3, 1645.

General Mercy, who commanded the Bavarians in 1645, supposing that the French, commanded by the Duke of Enghien and the Marshals Turenne and Grammont, after many advantages, which they had gained over him, would form the siege of

of Norlingen; to prevent that measure, passed the river Wernitz, and entrenched himself advantageously at the other side; having in his front the village of Allerheim, situated in a sort of valley, in the middle of the plain of Norlingen, formed on the right by Wyneberg, from which there is a gentle descent to the village, and on the left by another mountain, on which stands the castle of Allerheim. He posted all his cavalry, supported by some battalions, on the two hills, and his infantry in the valley in the centre; with the village, its church, steeple and church-yard occupied by infantry, and the whole front, from one mountain to the other, fortified and furnished with artillery. The Duke of Enghien attacked and easily carried the entrenchments of the village, but the Bavarians who had made loop-holes in the houses kept up such a fire as frequently to repulse the French, until Turenne having routed the cavalry on the right, and taken the infantry in flank and rear, the army was obliged to retreat, and the brave detachment in the village to surrender themselves prisoners at war.

In the same manner, inclosed fields and meadows should be occupied; easy communications should be made through all the inclosures, so that not only each part can assist the other, but that the line may remain uninterrupted, and no opening be left for the enemy to penetrate. To a neglect of this principle, the Austrians, under the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, owed in a great measure, if not entirely, the loss of the battle of Prague

Bosroger's
Principes de la
Guerre, page
347.

Lindsay's Mi-
litary Miscel-
lany.

in the year 1757. “ From a movement which
 “ they made opposite to the King of Prussia, to
 “ their own right, to gain more ground and form
 “ an angle, in the fear of being attacked in flank
 “ and rear; they suffered several inconveniencies.
 “ Great haste being made in unfavourable ground,
 “ their columns lengthened, which when they
 “ came to form, occasioned several intervals, and
 “ a great space between the angle and that part of
 “ the army behind Sterboli. The left side of the
 “ angle had not taken up a right alignment, which
 “ seems to have been the cause of this opening of
 “ above 400 paces.” The king, whose eye no-
 thing could escape, immediately saw and took
 advantage of this mistake. General Manstein was
 ordered to advance, with three battalions of gre-
 nadiers, two regiments of infantry and a body of
 cavalry, which service he performed, in spite of the
 very great natural difficulties of the ground, which
 was extremely rugged, and the redoubts of the
 enemy. The gaining of this post was of the
 greatest consequence. Flanking batteries were
 immediately established, and the Austrian line en-
 filaded, which could not fail of being decisive.

This example alone is sufficient to shew how
 necessary it is to march close and well locked up.

Infantry is posted behind rivers, morasses and
 ravines, to stop the progress of the enemy: for this
 purpose it is not necessary that there should be an
 uninterrupted line, all along in rank and file; but
 that every part, where an enemy can pass, should
 be within the reach of small arms, and defended
 as

as much as possible by a crossing fire. Infantry of the line has generally two field pieces attached to each battalion, together with the necessary ammunition waggons, besides four bat horses per company, to carry the tents, blankets and camp kettles.

In our service the light infantry differs from that of the line, only in being composed of the youngest and most active men; but in the German armies they are marksmen armed with rifles, and trained to fight behind hedges, walls and in woods. As they are generally posted in villages and situations where they can procure cover, they are not incumbered with tents; neither have they guns attached to their battalions.

The cavalry is likewise divided into heavy and light. The first formerly wore cuirasses; but as the defence which they afforded was found not sufficient to counterpoise the inconvenience of carrying them, they have been generally laid aside. The broad sword or sabre is the true weapon of the cavalrist, although he is provided with a carbine for skirmishing occasionally, and pistols for his personal defence in case of misfortune, and to give him confidence. Of cavalry.

The heavy cavalry is, or should be, used only to charge the enemy in close order; this should be done with the greatest vivacity; but at the same time with compactness and regularity. The enemy being broken is cut to pieces with the sword.

The cavalry is divided into squadrons of, from 120 to 180 men, in our service at present 180.

The

The squadrons have small intervals between them, and each has a standard. Heavy cavalry is used chiefly in open ground, where it can be employed with advantage against all sorts of troops, and even against batteries. The velocity of its movements, by which it can turn and cut off the enemy, take him in flank or rear, renders it extremely useful.

Dragoons were formerly a sort of mounted infantry, who marched on horseback, but generally fought on foot; but the inconvenience of that practice (by the neglect and consequent destruction of the horses by separating the men from them) was found to be so great that they are never now, dismounted, except in cases of the most urgent necessity, and must be considered as cavalry.

As the horse carries, not only the man, his arms, baggage, ammunition and provisions, but also his own forage, the officers should take care that nothing unnecessary is packed upon him.

Light cavalry only differs from the heavy, in being composed of smaller men and horses, and being more lightly equipped. Ours, combining strength and activity, is the best in the world.

Use of light
troops.

The particular service of light troops, whether cavalry or infantry, is to keep as near the enemy as possible; watch all his motions, and discover his intentions; beat up his quarters frequently, and keep him in a state of alert, in order to fatigue him; drive in his piquets and out-posts; carry off his patrols; intercept his convoys, and destroy his magazines; slip between his posts, and do him

him all the mischief that is possible; pursue him when he is beaten, and complete his defeat, and retard his pursuit when he happens to be successful; penetrate into his country and levy contributions. They are likewise to cover the movements of their own army; for this purpose they form a chain in front, and on its flanks; all the parts of which must be able to communicate with one another, and to fall back with facility upon the army. It is of consequence that the different sorts of troops should be posted in ground adapted to their mode of fighting; the cavalry on plains and in the open country; the infantry in close intersected places, behind hedges, walls, ravines, abatis's, redoubts, &c. and in woods: I have already given their duties in detail in another place. Their numbers have increased in all the European services of late years: Frederick the Great saw their great utility, and added many regiments of hussars, and battalions of light infantry to his army during the seven years war: he says in his Military Instructions, "that it
 " is almost impossible to surprize an Austrian army
 " from the crouds of Croats, Pandours and Hussars with which it is surrounded." He found the want of well constituted light troops at Hochkirchen.

Military Instructions,
page 69.

Towers's Frederick III.
Vol. II. page 128.

" After various movements for protecting Banderburgh from the incursions of the Austrians,
 " and cutting off their communication with Bohemia, Frederick took post in the neighbourhood of Hochkirchen, with his left at Bantzen; from
 " whence

Surprize of the Prussians at Hochkirchen.

Towers's Fre-
derick III.

“ whence he could command both Misnia and Lu-
 “ fatia, and keep up a communication with Prince
 “ Henry. In this position Marshal Daun resolved
 “ to attempt an attack by surprise upon the right
 “ of the Prussians, who had neglected to occupy
 “ the heights that commanded the village of
 “ Hochkirchen, which was only guarded by a few
 “ free companies.

He accordingly began his march late at night the 13th of October, 1758; having ordered a diversion to be made on the left of the Prussians at the same time, to prevent it from affording assistance to the right; he occupied the hill above Hochkirchen, and erected batteries upon it, cut the free companies to pieces, and attacked the camp about four o'clock in the morning of the 14th. It is well known that the Prussians lost on this occasion, their camp equipage, a great part of their artillery, and 7000 men; among whom were Marshal Keith and Prince Francis of Brunswick killed, and many officers of rank taken prisoners.

Of the
Artillery.

The artillery is composed of bombardiers and gunners in our service; in others, they have also sappers, miners and pontoniers. The bombardiers and gunners are destined to the service of the guns, and are armed with firelocks like the infantry, which are however of no use to them, except to give them confidence, and now and then for personal defence. Sappers and miners are only useful at sieges. Pistols and daggers are the only arms which the latter can have occasion for under ground; the duty of the former seems to require none at all:

all: They however, carry arms for parade: they do not seem to be more necessary for the pontoniers, whose only business is to throw bridges of pontoons across rivers.

To take the word in its fullest extent, the com- Engineers.
 mander in chief is the first engineer; and under him the quarter-master general, who regulates and marks out the movements, encampments, and quarters of the army. Engineers properly speaking, conduct, under the general, the operations of besieging, fortifying, and defending towns. The field engineers are entrusted with the duty of taking up positions and preparing the camps and roads for the army, likewise constructing field works, and fortifying the camp; reconnoitring, and pointing out the attacks on the positions of the enemy. In short the business of an engineer far exceeds the limits of this work, and the ability of the writer; but Muller's Works are open to every body, and all those who are employed in the quarter-master general's department should understand the field part of engineering. Besides the above corps, the army is always provided with a corps of guides: though their officers are permanent, the men are changed frequently, and their duty is obvious: they are attached to the quarter-master general's department.

In general, the staff is posted in a place of tolerable security, which is called head-quarters. The staff. It is composed of the commander in chief and his suite; the quartermaster-general, the adjutant-general, the paymaster-general, commissary-general, physician

physician and surgeon-generals, apothecary-general and waggon-master general, with all their deputies and assistants, and the provost marshal.

The train.

The train is divided into that of the artillery, which is again subdivided into field and siege trains under the commanding officer of artillery, and the pontoon train, which is under the command of a particular officer; the provision train, which, as well as every thing concerning provisions and forage, is under the direction of the commissary-general; such as the field bakery, ovens, &c. &c.

The baggage of the head-quarters includes that of all the sutlers, and followers of it; and together with the baggage of the whole army, when assembled, is under the command of the waggon-master general, who has a corps of wagoners under his orders.

The provost
Marshall.

It is the duty of the provost marshal to preserve order and regularity, by taking up all marauders, and other offenders, and to remove all nuisances. All sutlers are under his command when the army is encamped.

The hospital.

The hospital is divided into the field hospital, which constantly attends the army, and one farther removed in the rear for difficult and tedious cases; besides which each regiment has its particular hospital.

Spies.

Not only every general commanding an army, must employ spies; but also officers commanding out-posts; but as the same man frequently gives information to both parties, the greatest caution should be used in trusting them, as they may be
bribed

bribed by the enemy to deceive; which if discovered, they should be immediately hung; they should not be known to each other, and should always be examined separately.

Voltaire's
Age of Louis
XIV.

William III. commanding the allies in Flanders in 1692, having taken a spy employed by the enemy, obliged him to write a letter of his dictating to the French general, which so completely deceived him, that William surpris'd his right wing at Steinkerk.

Spies being employed in all armies, the necessity of preventing any person from passing the out-post without a regular passport, is obvious.

The denominations of all the staff officers, sufficiently denote their duties to every regimental officer; it is therefore unnecessary to detail them here.

Therefore having already mentioned the officers and departments, on which they roll, I shall proceed to treat of the great operations of the army, or at least the principles on which they are conducted.

Troops are encamped, in order that they may be more readily able to act collectively against the enemy. The camp takes its name from the headquarters.

Of Encamp-
ments.

In order that the camp should afford no advantage to the enemy, the following rules should be observed.

Rules for
Encamping.

1st, The ground must be neither too extensive, nor confined. 2d, The enemy must not be able to attack it in flank nor rear. 3d, Neither must it be liable to be attacked in front unexpectedly, and before proper measures can be taken for its defence.

fence. 4th, The approach, in front, must be difficult, and so situated as to be easily defended by musquetry. 5th, The communication through the camp must be such, that all the parts of the army can mutually support one another. 6th, The egress from the camp, must be easy to the army on every side.

First rule.

Whatever space a battalion or squadron occupies under arms, it requires for the front of its encampment the same ground. Therefore the same ground that the army occupies under arms, allowing the proper intervals between squadrons and battalions, will be necessary for its encampment; but if the extent to be occupied is too great, then the intervals must be enlarged; but never more than a space equal to the front of the battalions and squadrons; which is called the half full line. An army seldom encamps in one line; but generally has two, and a reserve behind the second. When any squadron or battalion is detached from the line, the ground is taken up by another. It is very easy from the number of squadrons and battalions, in the first line, to know the space necessary for the camp. With respect to the depth, each line requires 300 paces, which is the distance between them in battle, in order that the second may be out of the reach of fire.

Second rule.

The second is, that the flanks should be covered; which they are if the enemy cannot march directly against them, without first forcing the posts which cover them, or making such a detour as to give sufficient time to take proper measures to

to frustrate his attempt. Therefore let us see by what the flanks can be secured. 1st, by the sea; but then we must examine how deep the water is; strengthen it by stockades, and every other method as far as it can be waded through; inform ourselves of the possible changes in the ebbing and flowing of the tide, and be sure that the enemy's ships cannot annoy our camp. 2d, Rivers; these are excellent supports for the flanks, when there are but few passes over them, and they easily defended. 3d, Lakes; their excellence depends upon their size and depth, and the distance which the enemy is obliged to march, in order to get round them. 4th, Morasses; provided we know to a certainty, that they are impassable. 5th, Mountains or ravines; when they are very steep; but if they can be climbed, they should be fortified. Ravines are good cover for a flank, when the hills which form them are higher on our side than that of the enemy; but they should be fortified, and commanded in such a manner that the enemy cannot pass them. 6th, Woods; but they are not a good support to a flank; for even though we abate them, the enemy can establish himself in them.

The King of Prussia objects to encamping near woods, as they encourage desertion; but that crime is so little known in our army, that no objection should be made on that account; villages, when well situated are an excellent cover to the flanks; but they must be so fortified and defended that the enemy cannot think of attacking them

Military
Instructions.

them with any prospect of success, as on them depends the safety of the whole army.

Third rule.

The third rule says, that, neither must it be liable to be attacked in front unexpectedly, and before proper measures can be taken for its defence: therefore there should be no villages, woods, hedges, ditches, or any thing else which can cover the approach of an enemy, within the range of cannon, in front of the camp; neither must any ravines nor hollow ways, through which he might march concealed, be in front of the army; neither any heights; but in case of attack the enemy must be under the fire of our whole front; and all his movements must be so exposed to our view, that we can take our measures to counteract his intentions: towards this, it is necessary that all such things which happen to be in front, should either be destroyed, or fortified and occupied by troops, so as either to repel his attack, or at least give time to the army to retreat, and be out of all danger.

Fourth rule.

The fourth rule has a great analogy to the former; in as much as whatever protects the flanks, affords a proportionably greater protection to the front; as the flanks should be perfectly secured against any attempt, whereas it is sufficient that the front is rendered difficult of access. An army never fronts to the sea, except to prevent a disembarkation; in which case, care should be taken that a heavy and collected fire may be kept on the landing places: the same rule applies to lakes, inundations, and morasses, which render the front almost inattackable.

inattackable. A river is a great impediment to the enemy, if there are but few fords, and that he is obliged to throw over bridges under our fire. A perfect morass renders the front inattackable; but even when it is only difficult to pass, it affords a great defence. Woods are a disadvantage, in front, as they afford cover to the enemy.— Ravines and hollow ways running along the front, afford a good defence; but if they intersect it, their course should be commanded by our fire. When villages are tenable, they afford a good protection; but otherwise they should be destroyed; the same rule applies to all single houses and buildings.

The fifth rule requires, that no river, morass, ravine, or unpassable wood, should intersect the army, much less separate the two lines. Whenever it so happens, bridges, and roads of communication should be made. Fifth Rule.

The sixth rule requires, that the egress from the camp should be easy on every side to the army; and that, of course, roads should be prepared for that purpose, as soon as the camp is marked out. However, it is not easy to find a strong camp from which an army can move forward with facility, in the presence of an enemy. But if we mean to advance, we shall not look for a strong front to our camp. On the other hand, if we mean to remain on the defensive, it will be sufficient to find the roads open to the flanks and rear. Sixth Rule.

It is evident, according to the third rule, and the nature of our arms, that if there are high grounds

within our reach, we should prefer them to the hollows for our camp. We know that shot fired from low ground, has but little effect against any thing above it; and that the fire of depressed guns, from a very high situation, is equally ineffectual. Artillery does most execution, placed on a gentle ascent, where a grazing or skimming fire can be obtained. Beyond the distances of two hundred toises, fire is very uncertain; within that space it will have some effect: but, at 100, it becomes formidable. The range of battalion guns cannot be esteemed at more than one hundred and fifty toises, and that only for round shot; grape and cartridge shot do not tell farther than musketry.

Out Posts. I have already said, in another place, that, for the security of the camp, out-posts must be detached: they must be posted so far from the army, and in such a manner, that it can always be formed, and ready to defend itself before the enemy can arrive. Those out-posts must form a chain, through which nothing can pass unnoticed, and be able to support each other: they are composed of light troops, and troops of the line. Upon plains, they consist of cavalry; and infantry, in close intersected ground. A post of light cavalry is (among the Germans, whose hussars and dragoons are mounted on very small horses) generally supported by one of heavy: but with us, the light dragoons will answer for both; this is again supported by one of infantry. In woods, and behind hedges, light infantry are generally posted; and troops of the line in houses, villages, and behind works. Each
post

post advances one or more piquets in his front. The small posts of cavalry are not expected to maintain their ground, but to retreat from a superior force: but the infantry should make every possible resistance, in order that the army may have sufficient time to prepare for action. As soon as any one post perceives the enemy advancing, it should give notice to the others: but I have already detailed the duties of out-posts. In open countries, where the enemy meets no natural impediment, they should be considerably advanced; but in a strong close country, they may be posted nearer to the army.

As the necessities of the troops require wood and water, it is indispensable that attention should be paid to those articles, therefore care must be taken that they are not spoiled or destroyed; likewise, the forage which may be in the neighbourhood of the camp.

Convenience
of the Troops

The quarter-masters of regiments set out from head-quarters, under the command of the quarter-master-general. After he has marked out the ground, with the intervals to be observed between battalions and squadrons, his assistants distribute it among the brigades or regiments, according to their strength; and the regimental quarter-masters distribute it among the troops and companies.

Marking out
the Ground.

Those are the rules for encamping, deduced from the precepts and practice of the greatest Generals, from which nobody can depart, with impunity, before an enterprising and experienced enemy.—

Great genius will, and may deviate from rules, because it surpasses them; but the greatest men have

Towers's
History of
Frederick III.
Vol. II. page
128.

been known to suffer by it, and repent. We have already seen how the King of Prussia was surprized by Marshal Daun, at Hochkirchen, by omitting to occupy the hill above the village, and not sufficiently guarding the latter. Colonel Templehoffe, in his Remarks on General Loyd's History of the Seven Years War, attributes the victory of the Austrians over the Prussians, at Breslaw, to the great extent of the Prussian entrenchments. The camp which the French occupied at Minden was much too confined for such a great army, acting on the offensive: there was no way of advancing from it, but by a narrow road between the town and a morass, and afterwards forming on the plain of Minden. The King of Prussia says, in his Posthumous Works, that a camp, like a garment, should be fitted to the body which is to occupy it. In 1706, Prince Eugene attacked, and defeated the French army, besieging Turin, under the command of the Duke de la Feuillade: their position being intersected by the Doire, and the necessary communication interrupted. In 1712, Prince Eugene was beat at Denin, by Marshal Villars, his position being too extensive: Lord Albermarle was posted at Denin, which was at too great a distance from the Prince for mutual support. This Villars perceived; and while a body of dragoons kept Eugene in check, fell upon and defeated Albermarle.

Those are some of the faults of those great men. — Those who would profit by their example must study their history.

Of Marches.

Every officer is, or ought to be, in possession of
Lieutenant

Dundas's
Sketch of the
Campaigns of
Duke Ferdi-
nand.

Voltaire's
History.

Lieutenant-General Dundas's System of Military Tactics; and, is consequently acquainted with the manner of marching his regiment.—I shall, therefore, laying aside that part which we see practised every day, proceed at once to the march of an army.

Were an army, with artillery and baggage, to march in one column, it would require too much time to get in motion, or to form in order of battle: it, therefore, generally forms more; but their numbers depend on the ground, and the object of the general. The following rules are then to be observed:—

First, In advancing against the enemy, or retreating from him, as many columns should be formed as the ground will admit: as the more there are of them, of course, the shorter they will be, and the sooner formed in order of battle.

The ground admits of as many columns as there are roads to be found or made, but care must be taken that they are all good; otherwise, fewer columns will be better, as what delays one, retards the whole army.

Second, If we can form but few columns, our precautions should be increased, so that either we may not be attacked, or that we may have time enough to be formed in good order before the enemy can arrive. If we expect the enemy on the flank, and that he can attack us suddenly, we generally march by *lines*, so that each line can form at once on its own ground; but if it is probable that he cannot attack us so suddenly, it is more convenient to

See the Orders
of Duke Fer-
dinand in
General David

Dundas's
Sketch of the
Campaigns of
1757, 8, 9, 60,
61, and 62.

march in more columns. When the march is to be through a woody and mountainous country, the cavalry should not form the outward columns, but be covered by the infantry: the artillery and baggage are always on the most protected roads.— In advancing and retreating, the columns generally consist of a part of both lines.

Security of the
March.

For the security of the march, the following measures are taken:—There is a strong advance guard, if the movement is forward: its composition regulated by the nature of the country: it sends out parties of light troops on every side, as far as possible, to give timely intelligence of the approach of the enemy. The advance guard not only supports those detachments, but covers the army in its march against any corps which may be advanced against it, drives back any of the enemy who approach it, and resists him, should he attack with his army, until we are formed and ready to receive him.

In retreating, the rear guard performs the same duties, and takes every advantage of situation which the country affords, to retard the progress of the enemy. Both should, by their manœuvres and their detachments, cover all the columns of the army against an attack. When the enemy is expected on the flank, troops are detached on that side, who likewise send parties to reconnoitre. The baggage always marches, covered by the army; advancing, it is in the rear; retreating, in the front; and on a flank march, on that side where there is no danger to apprehend. When there is no danger,
it

it often immediately precedes, or follows the brigades or regiments; otherwise, it precedes, or follows the army at a considerable distance. When the army marches with an intention of fighting, the artillery is brigaded in the columns, and forms with them; otherwise, the park has generally its own column. The columns should never cross upon each other on the march; never close or separate too much; never get too forward, nor fall back. The first of these depends upon the quartermaster-general's assistants, or field-engineers, who mark the routes; the last, on the officers who lead the columns. When any column is delayed by a defile, the others should wait for it. But if the whole army should be obliged to pass one, care must be taken that nothing is to be apprehended from the enemy during the operation.

The convenience of the army requires good roads; the best for the artillery: for the cavalry, marshes and woods should be avoided; also steep hills, ravines, &c. even by a *detour*. For the infantry, attention should be paid to the distance, that the men should not be too much fatigued.—As all the columns should march and arrive on their ground nearly at the same time, there should be no sensible difference in the length of the routes.—The routes are marked by the quartermaster-general's assistants, with sticks stuck in the ground, and wisps of straw tied to them. Where two columns are obliged to touch, one of the routes is distinguished by two sticks crossed, or some other mark.

Convenience
of the Troops.

See Duke
Ferdinand's
Orders in
General Dun-
das's Sketch.

Detach-

Detachments.

Detachments are made for the following purposes:

First, To occupy a post.

Second, To fall upon some post or detachment of the enemy.

Third, To reconnoitre.

I have already detailed their duties; the greatest principle of which is to keep the object for which we are detached in view, and not to deviate from it.

In 1600, Maurice, Prince of Orange, having disembarked his army between Ostend and Newport, detached Count Ernest, of Nassau, to Infengen-bridge, to occupy that post. The Count, on his arrival, found that the Spaniards had already passed it, and attacked them with his detachment of 2000 men, instead of falling back upon the army; from which he was immediately cut off, and glad to make good his retreat into Ostend, by which Maurice was deprived of his assistance in the engagement which immediately followed, when the Spaniards were defeated.

Local knowledge.

A general acquires his general knowledge of the country by the maps, and a more detailed one by the plans, which are drawn by the officers under the direction of the quarter-master-general, and other intelligent officers who are sent to reconnoitre, and inform themselves of the resources of the country with respect to forage and provisions: they bring back with them such people as can give the best information.

Proportions of an Army.

The strength of the army should be proportioned to its object, and the force which is to be opposed to it. In an open country, a great establishment
of

of cavalry is necessary. In a mountainous, woody or intersected country, or where there are many fortified places, a numerous infantry; and in the latter case, a great train of heavy artillery. — Where a war of posts may be expected, a large field train: where many rivers are, a great pontoon train; and where but few or no navigable rivers are, a numerous provision train.

Magazines of provisions and forage are formed Provisions. for the support of the army, as well as military stores. They are frequently established in different places, in order to deceive the enemy in the intended point of attack. The subsistence of the army being a matter of the greatest importance, not only the greatest attention is to be paid to the circumstances of the country in which it is to act, but also to the season of the year. If you mean to enter the enemy's country in winter or spring, it will be impossible to advance more than three or four days march from your magazines, with a large body of cavalry, unless you are pretty certain of being able to seize upon some of those of the enemy. There is generally a bread waggon for each troop and company in the army. They commonly carry six days' bread; the foldiers three: by means of these the army marches with nine days' bread: the provision train may carry nine days' flour: so that the army will move with eighteen days' bread or flour. The army can then only advance six days' march from its magazines to be stationary, until they can be moved forward, or others formed by deliveries from the country. The
field

field bakery commonly bakes every second or third day.

Colonel Templehoffe's Calculations, translated by the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, on "The Subsistence of an Army in the Field," are admirable, and should be in the hands of every military man who aspires to the honour of a command: it would be superfluous to detail them here.

In 1635, Prince Frederick Henry of Nassau, commanding the Dutch troops, penetrated into the Spanish Netherlands to the very gates of Brussels; but depending on the country for supplies, his provisions were cut off by the masterly conduct of the Cardinal Infant, commanding the Spaniards; and he was obliged to retreat into Holland, abandoning all his conquests, without a blow. We have many instances of the same kind, but one is sufficient here.

Offensive War.

When we mean to act offensively, at the commencement of a war, we must endeavour to anticipate the enemy—as Great Britain always did in the administration of the great Chatham. The necessary calculations of force, provisions, &c. must be made, as well as the time which the enterprize will require; and in case of its miscarriage, another fixed upon as a substitute.

Among the advantages to be thus gained are,—
1st, To seize upon one of his principal towns or provinces, as the King of Prussia did upon Silesia in 1740.—2d, To cause his army to be so dispersed, that it cannot be soon re-assembled.—3d, To fall upon one of his allies, and force him to a peace, as
Frederick,

Frederick did the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony; in 1745.—4th, To gain some post or town which opens a passage into the enemy's country; or the command of a river which runs through it.

To those are to be opposed,—1st, Strong places.—2d, Rivers.—3d, Defiles formed by mountains, woods, and morasses, besides the hostile army.

In the first place, the campaign will begin with a siege, which should be,—1st, Of a place that is the key to our own country, or that of our allies, or that of the enemy.---2d, One that commands a river which can serve for the transport of our stores or his.---3d, That commands our communications, or those of the enemy.---4th, Where the enemy has a magazine.

All fortified places which are not likely to be useful, either while the army is advancing, or in case of a retreat, should be destroyed as soon as taken. In passing rivers and defiles, attention must be paid to those places where posts can be established, answering either to cover the advance or retreat.

In an open country, we must endeavour to get possession of some tenable place, to establish a magazine, and which may serve to cover our retreat.

But above all things, we must never undertake any thing without being certain that we have sufficient time and means.

Alexander, and Charles the XIIth of Sweden, were equally ambitious, brave, and enterprizing. Alexander conquered a world by the prudence of his

his measures.—Charles ruined a kingdom, and would have lost it, had he lived, by the wildness of his schemes.

Taking the field a few days before the enemy, is sometimes productive of great advantages, which should be calculated, and the probable expence of men, horses, &c. balanced against them; particularly, the lives of the soldiers should not be thrown away. When Bonaparte sacrificed 3000 grenadiers to force the bridge of Lodi, which he could have turned by a march of a few leagues—he acted more like a Bacchanal than a General;—at St. Jean d'Acre, his desperate situation could only excuse his eleven fruitless assaults.

But when the enemy has already taken the field, and is posted so as effectually to oppose our entrance into his country, which we are, nevertheless, determined to attempt; or to prevent us from besieging one of his towns, we shall endeavour to effect it by a diversion: as the Imperialists and French, under the Prince of Saxe-Hilbourghausen, and the Marshal Soubise, in 1757, obliged the King of Prussia, by their irruption into Saxony, to quit his camp at Bernstaedt, and thus enabled Prince Charles to push forward Count Haddick with 8000 Austrians to Berlin.

In order that this diversion should have the proposed effect, it should put the enemy in great danger and consequent alarm: or,

Second, By interrupting his supplies, which is done by seizing the posts or rivers, by which he draws them; or by frequently attacking his convoys,

voys, for which a large corps of light troops will be requisite.

Third, By detaching.—This is a sort of diversion in the neighbourhood of his army; one or more corps are detached upon his flank or rear, who seize upon any posts which he has left unoccupied, intercept his convoys, &c. and do him all sorts of mischief.

Fourth, By marching and counter-marching, we shall endeavour to draw him from his post, or induce him to weaken it, and seize that opportunity of passing or forcing it.

In the year 1757, the King of Prussia, previous to the battle of Prague, made such movements as to induce Prince Charles of Lorraine to detach 20,000 men from his strong entrenched camp on the banks of the Moldau; which corps, Frederick, by a masterly manœuvre, cut off from all communication with the Prince, and then attacked him.

The last and simplest mode of penetrating into the enemy's country is, by a battle: but as it is likewise the most hazardous, a good general will prefer any other, when he has it in his power, unless the advantages resulting from a victory promise to be such as to counterpoise the risk.—In short, unless much may be gained, and little can be lost.

By the battle of Hohen Friedberg, the King of Prussia drove the Austrians out of Silesia, and was enabled to enter Bohemia; by that of Czaflau, he gained a peace and a province.

The

Defensive War. The general who acts on the defensive, labours under great difficulties: his motions are regulated by those of his enemy.—It is therefore his business to take the earliest opportunity of changing the face of affairs, and rendering his operations offensive: he must, therefore, be always ready for such an event.

If the country is defended by fortified towns, the army should be so posted as to be able to succour those which may be threatened: if by rivers, or other defiles, the passes must be occupied and fortified with field works; if it has neither fortified places, nor defiles for its defence, the army should be so posted as to be able to watch the motions of the enemy, in order to counteract his intentions.

Such was Marshal Daun's conduct in Moravia, in the year 1758, when he commanded the Austrians, and obliged the King of Prussia to raise the siege of Olmutz, by frequently throwing succours into the place, and intercepting the convoys of the Prussian army; such was the conduct of that general in 1757, when taking post at Kolin, he was so troublesome to Frederick, then besieging Prague, that he provoked the King to attack him in his strong intrenched camp, gained a complete victory over him, and obliged him to raise the siege.

Assembling the Army.

When the army is assembled to act offensively, a principal object is, not to point out, by its position, the intended point of attack: it should then be divided into several corps; but all so situated as to be able to join together with expedition and facility, roads should be opened and repaired on every side,

sides, and all the necessary cattle and carriages kept in readiness. The King of Prussia was a master in this art. His great opponent, Marshal Daun, is said to have declared of him, that he assembled his troops in such a manner, that it was impossible to penetrate his designs.

In defensive war, I have already said, the movements of the army must be regulated by those of the enemy; and of course, the camps and quarters, in which it is to assemble, must depend upon his supposed intentions. In assembling the army, fatiguing marches should be avoided, until the men and horses become gradually accustomed to the field.

If the country is defended by defiles, they are occupied by troops, while the main body of the army either takes a central position to support them, or follows the enemy in all his movements. In defensive war, as the army is probably inferior to the enemy, detachments should be made with great caution. I have already shewn the advantage which the King of Prussia reaped from the circumstance of Prince Charles having detached twenty thousand men, previous to the battle of Prague. It is better to leave a part of our country open to the depredations of the enemy, than to fritter away our army by attempting to occupy every post.—History affords many proofs of the truth of this maxim.

No detachment should be made to such a distance as not to be supported, unless it is equal, either by its own force, or that of its situation, to cope with any thing which can be brought against it, or at least to ensure a safe retreat.

The King of Prussia says, in his Military Instructions, that “ He should have been beaten at Sohr; and he deserved it, for having made such large detachments, if the abilities of his generals, and the bravery of his troops had not saved him.” — Such authority is worth a thousand examples.

Frederick himself has been blamed for having, in 1759, detached General Finck to Maxen, to intercept the communication of Marshal Daun, encamped on the plain between Dresden and Plawen, with Bohemia; but the Captains, now Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, C. and R. Crawford, in their notes upon “ Tielke’s Account of some of the most remarkable Events of the War between the Prussians, &c.” acquit the King totally; and attribute the capture of that General to his not having properly occupied the ground with which they were perfectly acquainted.

Of retreating.

When we would retreat, in order to avoid a battle, if the enemy is near, as we must take every precaution to prevent him from perceiving our design, we must avoid any noise or unusual movements: such as burning magazines, striking tents, withdrawing posts, &c. likewise endeavour to deceive the enemy by a good countenance, by strengthening our position, giving out false reports, &c. and, finally, by marching by night. — We must also secure our retreat, by occupying such defiles or other posts, as the enemy will be obliged to pass in following us, or post cavalry to attack him in flank. If he is at such a distance

as

as to be able only to harrafs us by his light troops, a detachment may be advanced to act offensively against them, and drive them back upon their own army.

The sick, baggage, and heavy artillery, should be sent in front at such a distance as not to impede the march of the army.

In the year 1591, the famous Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, commanding the Spaniards upon the Wahl, and having that river in his rear, Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, being opposed to him with a superior force: the latter imagined that it was impossible for his enemy to escape, until he saw him file over a bridge of boats, thrown across the river under the protection of lines constructed for that purpose. When the King of Prussia was obliged by Marshal Daun to raise the siege of Olmutz, he took his measures so well as to gain a full day's march on the Austrians, and advanced into Bohemia.

We advance, or march in a parallel line with the enemy, either for the purpose of acting offensively or defensively. If we would act offensively, we must take care not to expose our own communication with our magazines to be interrupted, unless we are sure of finding every thing in the country into which we march, neither our retreat into our own country to be cut off. When we know that those are secure, we march either in one body or in divisions, according to the object in view: if to give battle, or to invest a town, it will probably be in divisions or columns, which will all arrive at

Forward and
Parallel
Marching.

their points of attack at the same time, or at the place of general rendezvous ; in which case, the movements of all the divisions are combined. If we hope to succeed in our enterprize, we must be secret ; but at the same time, not neglect (in order to conceal our intentions) to send forward detachments to seize upon any posts which may be advantageous to us, or to the enemy, if first occupied by him. Those detachments must be of sufficient force to maintain themselves until the arrival of the army. If we march parallel with the enemy, we should endeavour to secure all the passes between the country occupied by him and our own army, whether we mean to penetrate or to prevent him from doing so.

In the year 1653, we have seen Marshal Turenne, with only 12,000 men, frustrate all the attempts of the great Condé with 30,000 : he, first, by posting himself judiciously between the two corps of the Prince's army, one having taken up its winter quarters on the Samber, the other in the county of Luxembourg, obliged him to make so great a *detour*, that he was enabled to take Rhetel before they could form their junction : and when the Prince threatened Picardy, the towns of which were without troops to garrison them, Turenne, instead of dividing his little army amongst them, which would have subjected it to be taken prisoner in detail, stuck so close to him, and posted himself so well, as effectually to prevent the Prince from undertaking any enterprize. His last campaign upon the Rhine in 1675, when opposed to Montecuculi, one of the greatest generals which the Austrian service has produced,

produced, is worthy the attention of military men : he not only prevented his opponent from entering Alface, but (himself) passed the Rhine with an inferior force, took such positions as never to be attacked, and ultimately forced the Imperialists to retreat.

In all combined marches, that is, when the army moves in several divisions or columns, which cannot immediately join together, it is necessary that, for the safety of the several divisions, the enemy should know nothing of our march, or that all the passes leading towards him, should be occupied by us in such a manner, that we shall have immediate intelligence of any movement which he may make against any of our columns ; that each division should have a secure retreat in case of misfortune, or can find situations on its march, in which it can maintain itself till reinforced by some of the others, or that, the enemy cannot attack one corps on its march, without being attacked in flank by some of the other divisions. The operations of armies acting at a great distance from each other are often combined. We see the King of Prussia, in 1757, marching four armies into Bohemia by as many different routes ; and we see, in the same war, the operations of the British and Prussian armies combined across the whole of Germany.

An army often marches by successive divisions. — For instance, when some great defiles impede or prevent the march of the whole ; or when a division is sent forward to seize upon some position or ma-

March by
successive Di-
visions.

gazine: in either of which cases, the advanced division should be sufficiently strong to sustain itself till the army arrives, or at least to secure a safe retreat; but in the latter case, it should not weaken the army so much as to prevent any other expedition, which might be undertaken in case of the failure of the first intended.

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Roi de Prusse
de 1778 à
1779, page 59.

In the summer of 1778, Prince Henry of Prussia being encamped at Plauen, near Dresden, and determining to march into Bohemia, detached Lieutenant-General Moellendorf to precede him with a corps, who, by forced marches, seized upon the important passes of Marienberg and Bafsberg, in which Marshal Laudon might have anticipated him. At the same time, General Platen was ordered with another corps to take possession of the defiles of Dippolswald and Riechen Staedt, while the Prince encamped with the army at Freyberg, on the same route that Moellendorf had marched, who pushed his advanced posts as far as Commotan, and destroyed the abatis's formed in that neighbourhood by the Austrians.

In defensive war, an army marches by successive divisions to reinforce a garrison, or occupy a defile through which the enemy might pass before the whole army is ready to march.

Feints or
Diversions.

Feints or diversions are made either by a detached corps, or by the whole army: if by a detached corps, the rule which equally applies to all detachments, great or small, should not be forgot, viz. that it must be able either to support itself, or to make good its retreat on the army. In either case,
the

the light troops are considerably advanced ; but we must not draw the main body too far from the real object. It is unnecessary to add, how essential it is that the feint should have the appearance of reality.

In July, 1760, the King of Prussia having taken the necessary measures for marching into Silesia, quitted his camp on the frontiers of Saxony, and proceeded through Lusatia towards Silesia : this induced Count Daun to do the same, who marched with such rapidity, in order to protect Silesia, that he got two marches a-head of the King, who then wheeled into the contrary direction, and suddenly appeared before Dresden.

In the same year, General Laudon, commanding an Austrian corps, after making several feints on Glatz, Schweidnitz, and Breslau, took possession of Landshut, and left a small corps in it, as if for its protection, which induced the Prussian General Fouguet to march from the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, in order to dispossess this corps, which he easily effected ; but the Austrian was, in the mean time, enabled to seize such passes as (nearly) to surround him, and completely to defeat him, and take him prisoner.

In the year 1778, Prince Henry of Prussia having advanced Moellendorf upon Commotan, as above-mentioned, and ordered Platen to take post between Grossedlitz and Maxen, as if he intended to march upon Peterwald : thus threatening both Prague and Egra, suddenly wheeled to the left, recalled Moellendorf, passed the Elbe near Gamig, and encamped between Stolpen and Radewalde, and

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de 1778 a
1779, page 62,
63.

from thence marched in four columns through the (supposed to an army) impenetrable defiles of the mountains of Bohemia, the heavy artillery and baggage taking the route of Zittau, leaving the mountains on the right.

Defiles.

The passage of a defile, near an enemy, is a dangerous and difficult operation: whether he knows our intention, and is prepared to oppose us, or is ignorant where we mean to attempt it, and watches our motions; and whether he is at the same or the opposite side. A defile cannot be considered as passed until the whole army, or at least a sufficient force to secure the passage of the remainder, has got through.

In 1745, the King of Prussia (at the battle of Hohen Friedberg) attacked Prince Charles of Lorraine, passing out of the defiles of the mountains which separate Silesia from Bohemia. Previous to this battle, the King had withdrawn his troops from all the passes which they occupied in those defiles, and caused the roads to be repaired, as if he meant to march to Breslaw, by which he effectually deceived Prince Charles, and drew him into the snare which he had laid for him.

We have already given some account of Prince Henry's passage of the mountains between Saxony and Bohemia, and his manœuvres to deceive Marshal Laudon.

For the passage of defiles in general, the roads are already made; but for rivers, there is this difference, for the most part, that a bridge must be first thrown over. It is generally formed of pontoons

toons, or boats; therefore some men are first sent across partly to defend, and partly to construct it. When we can command the other side of the river by the fire of our artillery and small arms, from our own side, it may be passed by open force; but for this there are necessary—1st. A convenient situation for constructing more than one bridge, where artillery and infantry can make a crossing fire in front of the places where the bridges are to be thrown over.—2d. That the bank on our side should be higher than that on the other, and that the course of the river should form a bow, with its arch towards us, and that it should not be too wide.—3d, That the ground should be such at the other side, as to admit of the immediate formation of the troops on their arrival.

When such a situation is found, and fixed upon, the infantry and artillery are posted where those arms can act with most effect, and as much as possible covered by field works. A detachment is sent over partly to construct the bridge, and partly to throw up works for its protection; which may be more or less strong according to the effect our fire can take from our own side. This detachment passes over by fords, boats or rafts; the cavalry by the first; the infantry by the last. The cavalry might also take infantry behind it, and either remain, if there is nothing to apprehend from the fire of the enemy) ready to fall upon any party which might attack the infantry constructing the bridge, or the work in front of it, or return to our own side. When the bridge is finished

ed and the work man'd with infantry, the ground at the other side determines which arm is to lead.

No prudent general will make such an attempt, except he is morally certain of success, as should he be beaten after having passed with the whole or part of the army, the consequence is obvious.

Bosroger, page
326.

The passage of the Leck (by Gustavus Adolphus) in the year 1632, is one of the most remarkable we know of in modern times to have been made by open force; it is one of the many proofs of the advantage which may be derived from the confidence of troops used to victory. Count Tilly, commanding the Bavarian troops, was in immediate expectation of being reinforced by General Wallestein with a large body of imperialists; the King of Sweden knew this, and resolved to attack him before the junction, although advantageously posted behind the Leck, having the Danube on his right, and the town of Rain on his left. Gustavus found a proper situation on the river, (forming an inverted bow) and erected three batteries of heavy cannon, one on the centre of the bow, and one on each side; the bank on his side being higher than that on the other, gave him every advantage: he threw over a bridge under the protection of his batteries, (concealing it by the smoke of wet straw, set on fire for the purpose) erected a work at the other side, and marched over his infantry, while his cavalry passed at a ford on his right; the death of Tilly decided a well-fought action in favour of the King of Sweden, and the
Bavarians

Bavarians lost 600 men killed, besides their general.

But as stratagem is always preferable to force, we shall first endeavour to deceive the enemy by feints, and throw over a corps sufficiently strong to protect the passage of the army, wherever he shall have left an opening: proper measures should be taken to protect the retreat of this corps, should such a thing be necessary: that is, works should be constructed to cover the bridge, and batteries erected on our own side, to make a crossing fire before it.

We know how the great Marlborough (in 1711, while he, with the grand army (inferior to the French Marshal Villars in numbers) threatened (in front) their lines extending from Bouchain on the Scheld, along the Senfet and the Scarpe to Arras; and from thence along the Upper Scarpe and the Riviere to the Canche, the opening between those two rivers being well fortified) ordered Lieutenant General Cadogan to take some troops from the neighbourhood of Douay and from the Garrisons of Lille and St. Amand, and to march to Arleux, there to pass the Senfet and seize the passes on that river and on the Scheld at Oisy: this was effected, (the enemy having withdrawn their troops from those posts) and the duke passed the Scarpe near Vitri: thus surprizing their boasted lines, and obliging them to evacuate them without firing a shot.

In passing other defiles almost every thing depends upon securing the openings at the other side,
for

for which purpose a corps is generally sent forward, to seize upon some post or strong position. The longer those defiles the more difficult to pass; (much more so than rivers) particularly if the enemy has fortified himself in the pass, as he must be first forced there, and the opening at the other side secured afterwards.

In the winter of 1742, the King of Prussia preceded his army, with only 400 hussars, and four battalions, through the defile of Jedowitz in Moravia, a force which he knew at that time to be sufficient to secure the opening at the other side, for the deployment of the army.

I have already shewn how Prince Charles of Lorraine, in 1745, lost the battle of Hohen Friedberg, not having first secured the openings of the defiles, so as to be able to deploy.

To defend a river.

After having destroyed the bridges, and brought the boats to our side; we post troops in all those situations, where they can either oppose the passage of the enemy, or observe his motions. If it is necessary to keep a bridge standing, it should be well fortified. If we have time to build field works in such situations as command the passes; they should be so constructed, that the enemy may be easily driven out, should he get possession of any of them. We then take post behind the river; and follow him in all his movements, either with the whole or a part of the army; or if the river forms a bow projecting from us, we shall take a position equi-distant from all parts of the line of defence, leaving troops posted on the bank, both
to

to watch the enemy and oppose him till reinforced. We must not then be in a hurry to march upon every alarm; but be very sure that he is in earnest before we put the army in motion against him. Unless we can venture to keep up bridges, and troops posted at the other side, to watch the motions of the enemy; it is almost impossible to prevent him (if active and vigilant) from passing a river of any considerable extent.

In the year 1760, Marshal Daun defended the river Katzbach, in Silesia, from Parchwitz to Kofsendau (about thirty English miles) watching his enemy so well, and reinforcing the several posts so judiciously, that the great Frederick could never venture to attempt the passage in any part.

There is another method of preventing an enemy from passing a river; but for which, our army should be nearly equal to his: that is to pass it ourselves, and take a good position, so that he shall not dare to attempt it, lest he should be attacked during the operation: it was thus, that Turenne prevented Montecuculi from entering into Alsace in 1676, when he (Turenne) passed the Rhine, at Ottenheim, took up a position, with his right at Wilstaet and his left on Fort Kehl, thus barring Montecuculi from any communication with Strasbourg.

The defence of the Elbe, in 1778, from the mountains of Reisen Geburge to Konigingratz, by the Emperor Joseph II. (having Marshal Lacy under him) was a compound of those two methods; as he not only kept up his bridges, and strong detachments at the other side, to watch the movements

*But Turenne had another
river in his front.*

*Divided on the left
of an arch.*

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page 107.

movements of the King of Prussia; but advanced General Wurmser, with a large force, over the river at Hohen Elbe, to fall upon Frederick, when he seemed by his march to the right, to meditate an attack on the left of the Austrian position.

The enemy may be prevented from passing other defiles in the same manner; that is, by watching his motions, and attacking him during the operation, while yet entangled in the defile: as the King of Prussia did Prince Charles at Hohen Friedbergh, and the great Condé did the Prince of Orange, (afterwards King William III.) at Senef in 1674. But there is likewise another manner: which is, by fortifying the pass; provided the fortification cannot be turned, or commanded by higher ground.

To retreat over
a river.

This is a very difficult operation, in presence of an enemy, as the army must necessarily be divided by it; the intention should therefore be concealed if possible: however, be it so, or not, all baggage, heavy artillery, &c. must be first sent over, and placed in security; a strong position taken up in the neighbourhood of the river, and even close to it, if the place where we mean to pass is not to be concealed; but otherwise, so that we may march from it into different positions at the same time, throw over bridges behind them quickly and pass over. If it is a river, the banks of which at the other side are favourable, they should be occupied by troops and artillery, and even field works erected on them: the army will then pass over without hurry or confusion, leaving the necessary detachments to de-
stroy

stroy the bridges; who will afterwards pass over in boats. Upon such occasions every method should be used to deceive the enemy, at least as to the time (as to place, perhaps, not being practicable) but at the same time no precaution against attack should be neglected. The rear guard should occupy such posts as can favour the operation, and the army be ready to support it. But when neither the time, nor the place can be kept secret, we would post ourselves behind entrenchments, of which there should be several lines, one within the other; so that according as the army became weaker, on this side by a part being passed over, it should have less ground to defend. There is little difference between a retreat over a river and through another defile, except that in this latter case, we have no banks at the other side, on which to plant troops and batteries; but it may afford situations where troops may be posted, who will successively cover each others retreat.

I have already taken notice of the retreat of the Prince of Parma, in 1591, over the Wahl, in presence of the Dutch army, under Prince Maurice of Nassau, afterwards Prince of Orange.

The King of Prussia in 1778, having in vain tried every art to induce Marshal Lacy to quit his strong position behind the Elbe, and all his attempts to pass it, being equally fruitless, resolved to retreat from the banks of the Elbe, and to put his army into winter quarters, which he effected with little or no loss, through a country full of defiles, and the roads very bad, by always previously

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146.

ously crowning with troops and artillery, such heights as commanded the several passes; and on the 17th of September, he sent his heavy baggage, field bakery, hospital, and part of the heavy artillery from his camp at Walstaet, over the Aupa, under a strong escort; on the 18th, at day-break, they were followed by the tents and light baggage, with the remainder of the heavy artillery; and on the same day the whole army passed over, the infantry on three bridges constructed for the purpose, and the cavalry by the fords; four batteries were previously erected on four heights, which commanded the right bank of that river, and occupied by as many battalions; a brigade of infantry of the line, 200 light infantry, and 400 hussars formed the rear guard, and destroyed the bridges.

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page 163.

About the same time Prince Henry determined, likewise to retreat from Bohemia into Saxony; and in order to deceive Marshal Laudon, then encamped and strongly entrenched at Munchengratz, behind the Iser, and to make him suppose that he had designs upon Prague, he ordered Moellendorf to advance along the right bank of the Elbe, towards that town, as far as Melnick, while Platen pushed detachments across the Egra to the very walls of Prague. Those manœuvres had the desired effect, and the Prince passed the Elbe near Lentmeritz, almost without interruption, Moellendorf's corps forming the rear guard.

In the month of December 1759, the Prussian General Diercke, being posted with seven battalions

lions of infantry, and 1000 horse on the right bank of the Elbe, opposite to Meissen in Saxony, finding it impossible to lay a bridge of pontoons across the river on account of the floating ice, was obliged to transport his men in boats; and when all were passed, except himself with the rear guard, consisting of three battalions, he was attacked on the morning of the 3d, by a large body of Austrians, and taken prisoner with all his men.

I shall say nothing of the passage of a river in presence of an enemy on both sides, it would be a desperate effort, of which I believe there is no example in history.

To prevent an enemy from retreating over a defile, we should post ourselves as near him as possible, watch his motions narrowly, and hold ourselves in readiness to attack him whenever he makes the attempt.

To prevent the enemy from retreating over a defile.

By the term, *battle*, is understood a general engagement; where only part of the contending armies is engaged, it is called *an affair*, otherwise there is no difference.

Of battle.

A prudent general never fights when he can attain his object by any other means: therefore before we resolve to give battle, we should consider and weigh the advantages likely to accrue from a victory against the disadvantages which may result from a defeat, and likewise the probability of the success. A general gives battle—1st, To drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of one of his chief towns, in order to invest it; as the King of Prussia fought the battle of Prague, and, after the victory, invested that town; and in it Prince

When to give battle.

Charles, with the greatest part of his army.—2d, To prevent the enemy from investing a place, or to raise the siege of one already invested, as the Duke of Cumberland attacked Marshal Saxe at Fontenoy, in order to raise the siege of Tournay, in 1745.—3d, To cover a siege, as Marshal Saxe did that just mentioned; and as the King of Prussia fought the battle of Kolin to cover the siege of Prague.—4th, To drive the enemy out of a country, or to prevent him from entering it. We see the King of Prussia, by the victory of Lissa, oblige the Austrians to abandon all Prussian, and most part of Austrian, Silesia; and the French by the loss of the battle of Minden, forced to retreat out of the bishopricks in 1758.—5th, When a general finds himself in such a perilous situation that nothing but a fortunate battle can extricate him: this was the King of Prussia's situation in 1760, when he fought and gained the battle of Torgau, against Marshal Daun, though superior to him in number, and so strongly posted as to render it highly imprudent for the King to attack him, had he not been so circumstanced that a defeat could not have made his affairs worse.—6th, When we expect to be weakened by a defection of some of our allies, or that the enemy is likely to receive a reinforcement. Thus we see Marshal Turenne in 1674, hasten, with an inferior force, to attack the Duke of Bournonville, (though strongly posted at Sintzheim) before he should be reinforced by the Duke of Lorraine, which he hourly expected; and we

we see that his judgment and enterprize were crowned with the success which they deserved.

In the year 1762, on the deposition and death of the Czar Peter III. his widow and successor Catharine II. immediately ordered all her troops, then acting in conjunction with the Prussians, to march back by the nearest routes to Russia. The King of Prussia, as he could no longer derive any advantage from the arms of the Russians, resolved to profit by their presence, and accordingly attacked the right wing of the Austrian army posted on the heights of Buckerdorf in Silesia, before they knew any thing of the defection of his allies, by whose presence their left was kept in check. In this affair Frederick took fourteen pieces of cannon, and by dispossessing the Austrians of the heights of Buckerdorf and some neighbouring villages, he cut off their communication with Schweidnitz, and was enabled to lay siege to that place.—7th, We shall seek to engage the enemy if we suspect a difference of opinion to prevail among his generals: witness the advantage which the Duke of Marlborough drew from the disagreement between the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendome in 1708, when he passed the Scheld in their presence, (which he probably would not have attempted, had he not counted on the above circumstance) and won the battle of Oudenarde.—8th, We shall seek a general engagement if our position or numbers, or any blunder on the part of the enemy, gives us such a superiority as to promise us success; and finally, if we know our army

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to be superior in discipline or manœuvres, which it can only be by the attention and intelligence of the officers of every rank, and the steadiness of the men; it was by this, joined to the resources of his genius and his perfect knowledge of the military art, that the great Frederick was enabled to win so many battles, against superior numbers and eminent generals, to preserve, and even add to his hereditary dominions against the united efforts of Austria, France, and Russia; and it was by this, that Julius Cæsar conquered the world.

When to avoid
fighting.

We shall avoid giving battle when it is our interest to do so: viz. for the following reasons:—1st, When our troops are new, and that we would gain time to discipline them.—2d, When our position is bad, or we are inferior in number.—3d, When we have reason to expect a better opportunity of fighting to advantage; as that the enemy will be obliged to detach, or that we expect a reinforcement, or that he will be obliged to move into some situation where we can attack him with some probability of success.—4th, When want of provisions or forage must soon oblige him to retreat. In fine, we will avoid a battle when we can lose more by a defeat, than we can gain by a victory, which is the case—1st, When the enemy has such positions or fortresses in his rear, as can prevent our reaping advantage from our success, and that we have none to stop his progress.—2d, When we can render advancing difficult and expensive to him, by our movements without coming to a general engagement, whereas our defeat might

might render it easy. In fine we shall avoid giving battle if we can attain our object without it.

In 1599, Prince Maurice of Nassau declined attacking the Spanish troops in Dutch Brabant when pressed to it by the States, although superior to them both in number and discipline, because he knew that want of provisions would force them to retreat. And we have seen Marshal Lacy in 1778, in his lines behind the Elbe, constantly decline advancing from them to give battle to the King of Prussia, although superior to him in numbers; while Marshal Laudon in his camp at Munchengraetz on the Iser, preserved the same conduct towards Prince Henry; and the royal brothers after many fruitless attempts to bring those eminent generals to action, were obliged to retire and take up their winter quarters; the one in Silesia, the other in Saxony, while the Austrian generals attained the object of the campaign, which was the preservation of Bohemia.

When we resolve to give battle, we shall consider what advantages we possess, and endeavour to profit by them: for instance, if the enemy is inferior to us in the number or quality of his troops; if he is badly posted, or has neglected the proper precautions, when in camp or on a march—We have already seen Frederick the Great surprised by Marshal Daun at Hochkirchen, by not keeping a sufficient look out; and Prince Charles of Lorraine beat at Hohen-Friedberg before his army could form, he not having previously secured the

mouths of the defiles—Or if his disposition is injudicious, or his retreat difficult and ours easy.

But if we are inferior to the enemy, either in the number or quality of our troops, we shall choose a strong camp and fortify it; our field of battle must be proportioned to our numbers; if we excel in cavalry, we shall prefer a plain; if in infantry, a close country; and we shall post those arms in such a manner, that they can mutually support each other, and the artillery where it can take most effect. All posts which are situated in our front, and which might annoy the enemy in his approach, such as houses, villages, woods, hedges, heights, &c. must be strengthened as much as possible, and occupied: all the commanders of divisions, brigades, &c. must be fully instructed; but above all things the retreat must be secure: for which it is necessary, that there should be no river or defile, immediately in our rear. The general who attacks, takes every possible pains to get information; he is generally with the advanced guard, and reconnoitres the enemy previous to making his disposition, and attacks either the whole line of the enemy, with his whole line (which can scarcely happen between two great armies) or one or both of the flanks, with one or both of his; or the center with his center; the first would be imprudent, as it leaves too much to chance: the attack with both flanks can scarcely happen, except we can out-flank the enemy; the echelon attack of one wing is the most approved; the attack with the centre seems bad,
as

as offering two out-jutting angles, which are always weak points ; but Lieutenant General Dundas has written so fully upon this subject, that any thing further from me would be both superfluous and presumptuous: his book is in the hands of every officer, and its principle should be impressed on the minds of every military man; it is only by being master of it, that we can ever attain that reputation to which we all aspire. If the attacking army finds impediments in its way, we must consider what those impediments are, and how they can be avoided or surmounted. If they consist of water, morasses, ravines, &c. we shall endeavour, by a quick movement to the flank or rear of the enemy, to force him to change his position, so that we may either entirely avoid the difficulties, or pass them without opposition; or, we shall endeavour to find some part of his line which he has neglected, or where we can approach without being much exposed to the fire of his batteries; or finally, we shall try to silence some of them, and push forward under the protection of our own; in which, as in every other case, every thing must be ready to open and prepare the ways for the troops; so that they may break into columns, pass the obstacles, and deploy into line as quickly as possible. At the battle of Prague, Prince Charles of Lorraine's front was covered by ravines and morasses: the King of Prussia marched to the left, passed his cavalry over the dam, and attacked the right of the Austrian position: the victory which ensued is well known. If the obstacles con-

sist of villages, woods, coppices, heights, &c. in front, in which the enemy has posted troops, we may, perhaps, avoid them by an oblique attack, or by turning his position; but if not, we shall dislodge him with our guns, and then make the attack on his line according to the disposition of the general. Frequently the whole, or a great part of both armies is successively engaged in a contest for one of those posts: such was the battle of Lowositz, in Bohemia; fought between the King of Prussia, and Marshal Browne, commanding the Austrians, in 1756, when the whole of the Austrian right wing was successively engaged (relieving and reinforcing the troops posted in the vineyards and village of Lowositz) against the Prussian left; and when the Prussians had succeeded in gaining possession of the post, Marshal Browne had taken up so advantageous a position behind it, that Frederick did not think it prudent to attack him: but by making a detachment to his right, as if he intended to turn his left flank, he induced Browne to repass the Egra, and take up his camp at Budin, and thus relinquish his design of relieving the King of Poland, and the Saxon army, blockaded in the camp at Pirna. Had Frederick defeated Browne, he might have wintered in Bohemia.

All hedges, corn-fields, ravines, coppices, &c. which can conceal an enemy, must be cleared by our light troops, lest the flanks of our columns should be annoyed by them when advancing to the attack: at the above battle of Lowositz, the Prussian cavalry suffered considerably by a flanking fire which they

they received (when charging) from a corps of Croats posted in some vineyards on the right of the village. At the battle of Kollin, a brigade of Prussian infantry being galled in flank by some Croats (posted in the meadows through which it was advancing in column) was induced to deviate from its proper direction, in order to drive them away; some other bodies regulating their movement by this false direction, occasioned a derangement of the whole plan of attack; an inconvenience which a few skirmishers being advanced, might have obviated. This was not the fault of the King of Prussia, but of the officer who led that brigade.

If we mean to attack a fortified camp, we shall first examine its weak parts; which may consist in some fault committed by the enemy: for instance, if the flanks are not secured; if some of the fortifications are unfinished, or so situated, that we can approach them without much inconvenience from their fire, if they are commanded by any of the neighbouring grounds: or finally, if he has made a bad disposition of his troops. We shall then make our disposition, which consists in the number of attacks; the time they are to take place; which are to be false, and which true, the number and order of the troops; and what they are to do in case a false attack should succeed: we deliver to the troops whatever is necessary to the undertaking; as hurdles, or fascines, when wolf-traps or morasses are to be passed, or to fill up ditches; axes when pallisades are to be attacked or palings passed;

Attack of a
fortified camp.

passed; and in fine, any tools which may be necessary. Circumstances must determine whether we shall make the attack by night or by day. The night attack has the following advantages; the chance of surprizing the enemy; little to be apprehended from his fire during the approach of the troops; he is more easily thrown into confusion, and our disposition is concealed from him; but it has the following disadvantages; the columns can easily lose their way, and miss the proper time and points of attack; we have the most dangerous sort of opposition to expect: viz. when the enemy stands upon the breast work, and with pikes and bayonets, push down those who attempt to climb up; confusion communicates itself as easily through the assailants, as the assaulted, and we lose the advantage which might be derived from a preceding cannonade upon the enemy's works; besides that, we shall not be able to follow up our victory, and render it so decisive as by day. Therefore it would be advisable to make the attack by night, only when the enemy's troops are either ill-disposed or undisciplined. But to march and make the dispositions in the night, so as to commence the attack at day-break, is to be preferred, as confusion is thereby avoided, and we have the day before us to follow up the victory.

When we have made our dispositions for the attack, and delivered out the necessary tools, utensils, &c. to the troops; we next examine what obstacles are to be removed by our artillery, which being effected, the troops advance in columns of
not

not more than two or three battalions, as it is better to make more attacks than to have very deep columns; these columns in approaching the enemy's works, take every advantage of the ground, to cover themselves from his fire: their approach is generally covered by the fire of artillery playing upon those works which defend the points of attack. When arrived on the glacis, leaping into the ditch, and climbing on the breast-work, should be as one act; while the foremost divisions are doing this, those who follow protect them by their fire from the glacis; the troops destined to support the attack, follow at a proper distance. As soon as a part has climbed over, the rest should immediately follow, take post within the breast-work, turn the guns which they find there, against the enemy, and drive him away by a heavy fire; under the protection of this fire, the workmen clear the nearest entrances, or open new ones, if necessary, to admit the following troops. If they consist of Cavalry (which they probably will, if the ground admits of their service) they charge as soon as a few squadrons have passed and formed, and cut down any of the enemy, who may still be inclined to resist. If they consist of infantry, they endeavour always to gain ground, until the different columns of attack unite and form the line.

In 1654, the great Conde, joined with the Spaniards, besieged Arras with 30,000 men, and the King of France's army, under Marshal Turenne, did not exceed 14,000. Turenne, however, seeing, that there was no chance of saving the place, except by attacking the enemy in his lines, resolved
upon

upon the attempt. He therefore drove in his outposts, and reconnoitred his lines and the ground in front of them; he examined every part, in order to leave him in uncertainty as to his intended point of attack. The Spaniards expecting to be attacked, added to their fortifications. They had dug a double ditch and double lines, with redoubts between, all furnished with artillery; they raised epaulements to cover them from the fire of the town, and that of the army; they barred the passages with waggons, upset; dug (in the space between the two lines) twelve rows of wolf-traps, and sunk stakes in the intervals. Notwithstanding all this, Turenne resolved to attack, and gave notice to the governor of the town to second him, by a sortie; he divided the army into three corps, all to make attacks upon the same front, lest by making them upon separate points, each corps depending upon the other, might act with less vigour; he determined to make the attack by night, in order that the enemy, not seeing any thing, should not venture to draw away troops from any part, to reinforce that attacked: and finally, he alarmed the enemy every where, by small parties of cavalry and infantry, acting separately along their lines. The march was conducted with the greatest silence, by the most concealed ways. The center commanded by Marshal Turenne, in person, and the left commanded by Monsieur de la Ferté, arrived at their points of attack before two o'clock in the morning, when a cannon shot gave them reason to suppose that they were discovered,

vered, and they commenced the attack without waiting for the Marshal de Hoquincourt, who commanded the right, and whose guides had led him astray. The infantry was formed in two lines, followed by the cavalry, and each detachment had horsemen attached to it to carry fascines and tools for the infantry, to fill up the ditches, and open the ways. He attacked the trenches, filled the ditches and passed them, covered the wolf-traps with hurdles, while the cavalry opened a passage for itself in another quarter, by forcing a barrier. The Marshal de Hoquincourt had not arrived at his post, and the attack of the Marshal de la Ferté had failed; but he gave it up immediately to enter the trenches in the same place that Turenne had forced them: the consequence is well known—the Spaniards lost 7000 men, 64 pieces of cannon, 2000 waggons, 6000 tents, 9000 horses, and all their baggage, besides being obliged to raise the siege of Arras.

In the year 1715, Charles XII. of Sweden, attacked the Prince of Anhalt in the night, immediately after he had landed in the island of Kiegen. “ The King of Sweden was right in so doing, (says “ the King of Prussia) because he wanted to conceal the small number of his men, which would “ have been obvious in the day time: he had but “ four thousand men, with which he came to attack “ twenty thousand, and was beaten.” At the battle of Malplaquet, the French occupied a very strong entrenched camp; but of which the entrenchments were not perfectly finished when the Duke of Marlborough attacked and carried them. They possessed the

the woods of Lagniere, La Mert, Taifniere, and Sarte, and the village of Malplaquet, with the surrounding hedges. The cavalry was formed in the intermediate openings. Those advantages they improved by entrenchments, and felled trees on all the ways to obstruct the approach of the troops. It appears that the main attack was first made upon the right of the French in the wood of La Merte, and in an intrenched opening; but that failing, Prince Eugene attacked their left in the wood of Sarte, drove them from it, and opened a passage for the cavalry, who passed through, formed in the plain, charged, and decided the fate of the day.

How to take
advantage of
victory.

Having succeeded in our attack, whether on an enemy entrenched or otherwise, we shall cause him to be pursued and harassed in his retreat, as much as possible, by the light troops, while the army follows, or prepares to follow, in good order to support them, until having forced him to retire a sufficient distance, we can lay siege to one of his towns, destroy some of his magazines, or invade some of his provinces. Of course, we shall not omit to detach troops to cut off his retreat, by seizing on the defiles in his rear, if he has neglected to occupy them. But at all events, we can harass him in his retreat through them. But it is proper we should guard against misfortune, and be prepared for every event. Therefore the retreat must be thought of in time, in case we should fail in our attack.

Retreat after a
battle.

For this purpose, the roads in our rear should be repaired and widened as much as possible; and all heights, woods, inclosures, houses, and villages, which

which are situated within musket-shot of them, should be occupied by troops, and furnished with guns, in order that the army may retreat in safety under their protection ; but care must be taken that those troops are not cut off when they have fulfilled their object.

Those precautions being taken, the guns are sent off: it may sometimes be necessary to sacrifice a few guns, particularly if they are mounted on a battery which protects the retreat of the army, but cannot be turned easily against it by the enemy. If there is any defile in the rear, those posts should be sufficiently strong to be able to resist, until the rear of the army has got into it. The troops follow the artillery ; and, if the country is intersected, the cavalry leading: but, if open, the infantry retreats first, and the cavalry covers it, by taking a position to fall upon the flank of the pursuing enemy. Those troops which have suffered least generally compose the rear guard ; the infantry of which relieves, and draws in upon it all the troops occupying the posts already mentioned. The rear guard occupies the mouth of a defile, or some other strong position to cover the retreat of the army by which it is reinforced, if necessary.

The situation of the camp is the first thing to be considered, if it can be turned, or is deficient in wood or water, the army cannot long remain in it ; the flanks must be therefore well supported.

Fortified
camps and
their defence.

The simplest method of fortifying a camp is by a parapet, with a ditch running along the front, flanked by fleches (which then take the name of redans

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redans) at proper distances, generally two hundred toises: but this method is very defective, as all the fire is collected in front of the curtain, and none before the redans. Upon this subject the King of Prussia says, “ Your greatest security will
“ arise from a skilful observance of certain maxims
“ in fortification, by which you make the front of
“ attack as little extensive as possible, and oblige
“ the enemy to make his assault in those parts
“ which are best flanked and defended.”

He likewise recommends an entrenchment, consisting of saliant and re-entering redoubts: the saliant redoubts at not more than six hundred paces from each other, in order that the fire of their musketry may cross; the re-entering redoubts are at a similar distance in their rear, covering their intervals, and forming right angles with them, so as to flank and defend them: they are joined to them by a trench and parapet.

When the works of a fortified camp are connected by a curtain, there should be several passages of (at least) thirty feet wide through it for the troops to march out and improve any advantage which they may have gained over the enemy: those passages may be closed by chevaux-de-frize, which are easily removed. They are sometimes covered by fleches on the outside, or traverses on the in, either of which affords an obstacle to the troops marching out, and should be avoided: the outward angles of the above redoubts must be to the enemy. But all camps, fortified by connected works, have this disadvantage, that the enemy may
make

make what movements he pleases in front of them with impunity, from the difficulty of marching out of them; and even when repulsed, he cannot be much molested in his retreat.

A camp fortified by its own natural strength and unconnected works, is therefore to be preferred; and such have been most of the modern fortified camps. Those works should be constructed according to the rules of fortification, so as to be capable of defending themselves, and the space between by a crossing fire. The works are manned in proportion to their extent, the troops formed two deep behind the parapet, with reserves to support them, and the army in the rear to act according to circumstances. The roads in the rear of the camp should be wide, and kept in good repair, so that the army may meet with no obstruction, if it should be necessary to retreat.

There are many obstacles which may be placed in the way of an enemy coming to attack the army, such as * wolf-traps, abatifes, flader-mines, &c. but which should be learned by studying field fortification.

When several fortified camps cover a frontier, good and spacious roads should be made along their line, and also from the camp of the grand army to each of them. It was by means of excellent roads that Marshal Lacy was enabled to oppose Frederick the Great upon the Elbe, in every point where he shewed a disposition to pass.

* Trous des loups.

Lines of Circumvallation.

Lines of circumvallation were formerly much in use with besieging armies, but are now laid aside. It is true that they rendered it very difficult for the besieged to receive relief, by detachments slipping into the town; but then they rendered the retreat of the besiegers very dangerous in case of a successful attack by the enemy on the outside: witness the fate of the Spaniards before Arras, already mentioned, when attacked by Turenne, in 1654; and that of the French before Turin, in 1706, when Prince Eugene carried their lines of circumvallation, (which were separated by the Doire) and took all their artillery and camp equipage. Sieges are now generally covered by an army of observation; but, if not, it is thought better to march against the enemy with the greatest part of the army, should he advance to attempt to raise the siege. It was thus that Marshal Saxe acted, when he fought the battle of Fontenoy: he had marked out, and fortified his field of battle with detached works, previously; and it was thus that Frederick the Great acted when besieging Prague in 1757, he attacked Count Daun at Kolin, and was beat.

I have already said that the camp should be proportioned to the number of men who are to occupy it. The battle of Breslaw, where Prince Charles of Lorraine passed the Lake by main force, and beat the Russians, commanded by the Duke of Bevem, proves the truth of this maxim. Colonel Templehoffe, speaking of the above battle, says, "The chief causes of our losing the battle, " seem

“ seem to me to have been the great extent of our
 “ entrenchments, and the superiority of the enemy’s
 “ artillery ; for we had but very few with the army,
 “ except some light three pounders attached to the
 “ battalions. Hence it was impossible to prevent
 “ the enemy from crossing the river.”

An army is said to be in cantonments when the troops are merely put into the neighbouring villages and towns, to shelter them from the severity of the weather.

Cantonments
and Winter
Quarters.

In winter quarters, they are more extended for the purpose of refreshing and recruiting them after the fatigues of the campaign.

An army in winter quarters should be so situated as to be able to assemble at a given point before it can be attacked, and so that none of the quarters can be carried by the enemy.

As horses cannot keep the field in very severe weather, the cavalry is often sent into cantonments or quarters, before the infantry. In this case, its quarters should be covered by the camp of the infantry, in such a manner as to secure them from surprize, so that either by the distance of the out-posts, the natural obstacles of the ground, or the resistance of the infantry, posted between it and the enemy, it may have time to assemble and march to the point where it can act with most effect before the enemy can arrive. When the General sees that it is no longer his interest to keep the field, the whole army marches into winter quarters, that is, when he cannot penetrate farther into

the enemy's country without first taking a town, the siege of which the severity of the weather prevents; when no post or pass remains for him to take, the possession of which may forward his views at the opening of the campaign, or which is necessary to cover his quarters, or, when no considerable advantage is to be reaped from keeping the field, when our strong towns are well provided: when our quarters are so situated, that the enemy cannot undertake any thing against them with effect, or at least without risking the ruin of his own army.

Besides which we must wait until he goes into winter quarters, which often prolongs the campaign to a late season.

The army generally takes up its winter quarters in order of battle: the right wing on the right, and the left on the left; the cavalry in the rear, as it cannot be safe in villages near the enemy. The light troops are posted in front, and on the flanks, protected by field works.

The army is generally covered by a river, or chain of mountains, the passes of which (on the near side) are fortified, and guarded by light infantry, which has light dragoons attached to it for patrolling. The patrols from those posts are frequent, but consist of few men: they approach the enemy as near as possible, and give information of any movement of his troops; but, as their intelligence must be deficient, spies (within his quarters) are always employed, who may sometimes give expeditious information by certain signals.

The

The extent of an army in winter quarters should not exceed thirty-two miles from right to left, and front to rear, so that the army may not have more than one day's march to make, in order to assemble in the center; and there should be no defile or obstacle to prevent an easy communication.

The winter quarters of the King of Prussia, in the years 1778—9, may serve as an example. The army, under the command of the Hereditary Prince (now Duke) of Brunswick, had its quarters in Prussian Silesia, their extremities being Ratibor, Troppau, and Jagerndorf; the two last being put in the best state of defence. Another corps, under General Tauenzein, occupied the country from near Jagerndorf to the boundary of the county of Glatz, where the corps of General Wunsch begun, and joining that of General Ramin in Middle Silesia, ended near Griefenbergh, not far from the borders of Lusatia. The King established his head quarters at Breslau, where the foot guards lay; the gardes du corps and genfdarmes were quartered in and about Ohlau. Prince Henry's army was distributed as follows: Platen's corps, from Dippoldswald to Kemnitz; Mollendorf's from Freybergh to Buckerfdorf; while the Prince of Anhalt Bernburgh distributed the Saxons from the Elbe to the quarters of Podjuský's corps, which had its left at Greifenbergh. None of the above corps occupied a space equal to that mentioned above, and yet each was of sufficient strength to sustain itself, while those next to it would have fallen.

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Roi de Prusse
de 1778 a
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219.

fallen upon the flank and rear of the enemy who should attack it.

For the detail of duty in winter quarters, I shall refer the reader to Lindenau's *Winter Posterungen*, (translated by the Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, in his *Military Miscellany*) who is very explicit on the subject. As the object of this sketch is not to give instruction, but to point out the sources from which it may be drawn.

Winter
Campaigns.

Winter expeditions are attended with such inconvenience to troops, that they are never undertaken without mature deliberation.

If the undertaking is against one of the main posts of the enemy, we must first consider, if by losing it, the enemy will be obliged to abandon all his quarters; or if we can maintain our ground in it, and from thence push further forward; and, finally, if the business is so certain that it is worth while to undertake it, merely for the sake of cutting off the troops. Having determined on the expedition, we shall (having insured our own retreat) endeavour to surprize the place, and post either a part of our detachment, or even the whole, between it and the enemy's army, both, because by that means we shall the more effectually prevent the troops from escaping, and likewise because, being attacked in the rear, they will make less resistance.

On the 1st of October, 1761, General Laudon surprized Schweidnitz. The troops employed on this expedition advanced with such precaution, that they
scaled

scaled the four out-works at the same time, and the garrison had scarcely time to fire a few cannon shot; the Austrians did not fire one. Having thus carried the out-works, they entered the body of the place by bursting open the gates, and made the governor and garrison prisoners of war.

An expedition of this sort is seldom undertaken without some reason to suppose that the duty is neglected, or but loosely performed in the quarter, otherwise the troops could not approach it without being discovered.

To induce us to make a general attack on the quarters of the enemy, we must have reason to expect, either to drive him out of them, to cut off a part of his army, or to surprize them; all which must arise from faults committed by him, either in not having properly occupied some strong posts, which we may turn to advantage: by extending his quarters too much; occupying them injudiciously, or not keeping a proper look out; or we may make a general attack to relieve one of our towns, inclosed within his cordon, and which he has not yet had time to take.

When a winter expedition is intended, the troops are drawn as close together as possible in their cantonments, and march in as many columns as the country will admit to the point of attack.

The winter campaign of Marshal Turenne, in Alsace, in 1674, when he beat up the quarters of the Elector of Brandenburg, and drove him out of that province, is one of the most admired.

But

But all the ability and enterprize of the best general, joined to the greatest bravery of the officers and men will lose much of the effect to be expected from them, if the troops are not well trained, and the officers perfectly masters of the system of manœuvre, without which they can never possess the cool confidence so necessary to ensure victory, and repair the misfortune of defeat. I shall here quote the battle of Lissa as an example of its advantages, where the King of Prussia, with an army of about 28,000 men, beat the Austrian army, consisting of at least 80,000.

On the 4th of December, 1775, the army moved at break of day from Parkwitz, and marched in the following order:—The van-guard consisted of four battalions of grenadiers, eight of infantry, eight hundred volunteers from the whole army at their head, all the light infantry and hussars—except one regiment, and three regiments of dragoons, with a battery of ten twelve pounders. The army followed in four columns, marching from the right by wings: the flank columns consisting of cavalry, and the two centre of infantry; the heavy artillery followed the centre columns in two brigades; three battalions covered the baggage, and a regiment of hussars had the rear guard. On the 5th, the army again marched, leaving the baggage with three battalions, at Newmark.

A corps of Austrian and Saxon hussars and dragoons was surprized near Bornä, by the van-guard.—During this attack the columns continued their march,

march, their heads being perfectly dressed, and the divisions preserving their intervals as exactly as at a review.

The King lead on his army in close columns, (the march being in front) and found the enemy stronger than he expected on their right, immediately counter-marched his columns, (by which manœuvre the Austrians were deceived, and supposed him retreating) marched to the right in open column, gained their left, formed two lines, the cavalry on the flanks, made the attack in echellon of battalions fifty paces behind each other to refuse the left wing, constantly out-flanking them, a part of the cavalry attacked their's in front, while the dragoons of Bareuth fell upon their left flank, the echellons formed up one after another, and a complete victory was gained.

The fire of artillery proceeding from the guns in a direct line upon the enemy's front, is the least dangerous; that upon the flank of his line the most effectual; that upon his rear, though not more destructive than upon the front, has a great effect upon the imagination of the men, and is very apt to strike him with panic.—The fire which proceeds from several points, and meets at one place, is the most destructive. Therefore, the following may be considered as rules:—First, We will endeavour to bring our guns to bear upon the enemy's rear, which, however, seldom happens, therefore we we shall place them on his flank, and enfilade his line, or at least endeavour to obtain an oblique fire.

Posting
Artillery.

L

Second,

—Second, We shall try to unite the fire of several batteries, at the point where it will produce the greatest effect. We shall endeavour to silence his guns by dismounting them, or killing the artillerymen, or to unite our fire at the point which is our object, or where we observe his troops to be crowded together; as batteries naturally attract the enemy's fire, no troops should be posted very close to them, but those which are destined to support them should be placed a little behind, or at one side, and as much screened as possible.


The enfilading battery which the King of Prussia established in the opening of the Austrian line, won the battle of Prague.


As to the battle of Lissa, the Austrians having got into great confusion, were at one place near a windmill, near one hundred men deep, of which the Prussian artillery took advantage.

I have thus endeavoured to illustrate every military maxim by some historical fact, but refrained from entering into the minute detail, which would be necessary to give a perfect idea of the operations and battles which I have quoted, for the reason which I have already mentioned, viz. that I do not pretend to give information on the subject, but merely to indicate some of the sources from which it may be drawn.


T H E E N D.

An Army with out posts of Musbars.







An Army with its Out-posts in a Country partly open & partly enclosed.






Pl.3





Pl. 4

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Vandeleur, John Ormsby

Duty of officers commanding detachments in the field

London 1801

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